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Debates about teaching intelligent design in public school 
science classes are inflaming communities across the nation. 
These controversies present thorny Establishment Clause ques-
tions at a time when that doctrine is less clear than ever. The 
ambiguity is not due to a lack of case law: Just last year, the 
Supreme Court issued two seemingly contradictory Establish-
ment Clause decisions, driven by what then-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist characterized as “Januslike” interests. McCreary 
County v. ACLU, with its focus on government purpose, is more 
applicable to curricular disputes such as intelligent design than 
Van Orden v. Perry, with its examination of passive, apparently 
uncontroversial expression. This Article thus examines 
McCreary County within the intelligent design context, focusing 
on McCreary County’s decision to import the “objective ob-
server” from the effects-endorsement analysis into the gov-
ernment purpose inquiry. Such analysis makes clear the ways 
in which a strict reading of McCreary County leads to undesir-
able results, and the reasons why the Court should retain 
McCreary County’s focus on government purpose, but reject the 
expanded role of the objective observer. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 18, 2004, the 3,700-student school district in Do-
ver, Pennsylvania became the first in the nation to require that 
its students be taught about the concept of intelligent design 
when learning the theory of evolution.1 The Dover school dis-
trict thus presented in public school science classrooms the idea 
that an intelligent agent must be responsible for the origin and 
variety of the species because evolution alone could not have 
produced such complexity. The Dover school district’s instruc-
tion in intelligent design was cursory, requiring only that the 
                                                                                                                  
1. Although Dover was the first school district in the country to require such 
instruction, other school districts have adopted policies implicitly or explicitly 
permitting intelligent design instruction. Most recently, in August 2005, the Rio 
Rancho, New Mexico school board specifically voted to permit high school 
science classes to discuss alternatives to the theory of evolution. See Martha 
Raffaele, New Mexico Schools Could Enter Battle over “Intelligent Design,” WASH. 
POST., Oct. 9, 2005, at A7. Additionally, the school board in Grantsburg, Wisconsin 
approved teaching “all theories of origin” in June 2004 and modified its policy to 
teach “various scientific models/theories of origin” in October 2004. John Angus 
Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer, How Should Schools Handle Evolution?, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 15, 2005, at A13. Cecil County, Maryland also has adopted a policy 
encouraging, but not requiring, the teaching of intelligent design. See Bruce 
Alberts, President, National Academy of Sciences, The Evolution Controversy in 
Our Schools, Letter to Academy Members (Mar. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.nasonline.org/site/PageServer?pagename=NEWS_letter_president_030420
05_BA_evolution. 
Additionally, a note on an issue that is not all semantics: Intelligent design 
advocates posit the concept of intelligent design as a “theory.” Used colloquially, 
“theory” indicates an untested explanation for a past or future occurrence, similar 
to a scientific hypothesis. In its technical, scientific sense, however, “theory” 
indicates a well tested, verifiable, and substantially proven scientific explanation 
closely akin to the common understanding of “fact.” Scientific facts, by contrast, 
are mere observations or results, usually from experimentation, with little value 
until understood in the context of a theory. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial 
Proceedings, Day 1 PM, at 91–92, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 
2d 707 (No. 4:04-CV-02688) (M.D. Pa. 2005) (all trial transcripts are available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/intelligentdesigncase/dovertrialtranscripts.
htm); NILES ELDREDGE, THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION AND THE FAILURE OF 
CREATIONISM 21–24 (2001). Accordingly, this Article refers to evolution as a theory 
and creationism and intelligent design as concepts. 
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following statement (modified slightly in June 2005) be read to 
biology students studying evolution:2  
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to 
learn about Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and eventually to 
take a standardized test of which evolution is a part. Because 
Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new 
evidence is discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the 
Theory exist for which there is no evidence. A theory is de-
fined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range 
of observations. Intelligent Design is an explanation of the 
origin of life that differs from Darwin’s view. The reference 
book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students who 
might be interested in gaining an understanding of what In-
telligent Design actually involves. With respect to any the-
ory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The 
school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to indi-
vidual students and their families. As a Standards-driven 
district, class instruction focuses upon preparing students to 
achieve proficiency on Standards-based assessments.3 
 In January 2005, when Dover science teachers refused to read 
the statement, the school district’s assistant superintendent did 
so instead.4 Even before the statement was read in Dover class-
rooms, however, parents already had challenged its constitu-
tionality in federal court.5 The trial in this case was the first in 
the nation to address the evolution-intelligent design dispute 
directly.6 Just six weeks after the twenty-one-day trial con-
cluded, the district court ruled soundly for the plaintiffs.7 
While the trial was in full swing, the ideological battle also 
played out in the Dover school board election, in which the 
eight incumbents standing for reelection (all supporters of the 
                                                                                                                  
2. The policy, as modified, mentions “other resources” about intelligent design, 
including PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN H. KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE 
CENTRAL QUESTION OF BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (2d ed. 1993), available in the school 
library. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 16–18. 
3. Dover Area Board of Directors, Board Press Release for Biology Curriculum 
(Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.ncseweb.org/kitzmiller/DASD_Policy.htm; see also 
Jerry Coyne, The Faith that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 233 NEW REPUBLIC 21 (Aug. 22 
& 29, 2005). 
4. See Lauri Lebo, Experts Won’t Back Dover, YORK DAILY REC., June 19, 2005, at 
C1.  
5. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709 (M.D. Pa. 
2005). 
6. See Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Lawsuit Opens with Broadside Against Intelligent 
Design, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A21. 
7. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 766. 
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intelligent design policy) were voted out of office on November 
8, 2005.8  
The district court’s strong decision in the Dover case may 
dampen the enthusiasm of some intelligent design proponents, 
but it certainly will not halt the movement.9 The controversy in 
Dover is representative of a rapidly growing number of pro-
posals surfacing across the country requiring that students in 
public schools study the concept of intelligent design in science 
class, or at least that teachers present a critical view of evolu-
tion (the first premise of intelligent design). In 2005 alone, 
forty-seven local school boards and fourteen state legislatures 
considered such proposals; between 2000 and 2005, sixteen 
state boards of education did so also.10 Last November, the 
Kansas Board of Education modified its state science standards, 
requiring schools to teach the “flaws” of the theory of evolution 
and effectively inviting schools to teach the concept of intelli-
gent design.11 Legislatures in Kansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, 
                                                                                                                  
8. See Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Board Slate Outpolls Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2005, at A4. The campaign mirrored the community’s turmoil: One incumbent 
sent out a letter on behalf of himself and other incumbents criticizing the 
Kitzmiller plaintiffs and describing the ACLU as an organization that defends 
terrorists as well as the right of the North American Man/Boy Love Association 
“to put out information on how adults can lure young children into having sex 
with them.” Teresa McMinn, Bonsell, Walczak React to Letter, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 
28, 2005, at A6; see also Teresa McMinn, Facts, or Smear?, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 27, 
2005, at A1.  
9. See Laurie Goodstein, Schools Nationwide Study Impact of Evolution Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at A20. 
10. See Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., Events of the Past Year: December 8, 2004 to 
Present, http://www.natcenscied.org/pressroom.asp?year=2005 (last visited Jan. 
17, 2006) (documenting legislative activity in 2005); see also Claudia Wallis, The 
Evolution Wars, TIME, Aug. 15, 2005, at 28–29. Eugenie Scott, Executive Director of 
the National Center for Science Education, noted that as of January 2005, the 
middle of the 2004–2005 legislative session in many states, legislators in thirteen 
states had introduced eighteen bills regarding the teaching of evolution, which is 
double the usual number of the past few years. See Debora Mackenzie, A Battle for 
Science’s Soul, NEWSCIENTIST, July 9, 2005, at 8. Some of the proposed legislation 
could have extreme consequences: In Florida, a bill was defeated that would have 
given public school students a cause of action against a teacher who demonstrated 
a “bias” towards evolution in the classroom. Id. at 9.  
11. See Kenneth Chang, Evolution and Its Discontents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, 
at D3; Dennis Overbye, Philosophers Notwithstanding, Kansas School Board Redefines 
Science, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at D3. After a parallel set of hearings in 2002, 
the Ohio Board of Education voted to allow the teaching of intelligent design. In 
Kansas, the proposed standards’ treatment of evolution was so controversial that 
just days before their scheduled adoption, the National Academy of Sciences and 
the National Science Teachers Association refused to permit the use of their 
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and Ohio already have passed state statutes permitting, but not 
requiring, science instruction about intelligent design.12 Similar 
legislation is pending in Georgia, Michigan, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, and Texas, and also may be intro-
duced in Utah and Indiana.13 These existing and proposed 
policies and statutes follow on the heels of federal-level sup-
port for teaching the concept of intelligent design. Conference 
committee language accompanying the federal No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) encouraged a critical teaching of 
evolution, and even President George W. Bush weighed in on 
this issue in August 2005, expressing support for teaching intel-
ligent design alongside the theory of evolution.14 
Whether presented in court or merely as legal advice to a 
state or local school board, legal arguments supporting intelli-
gent design already have assumed a common form: (1) The 
                                                                                                                  
copyrighted materials in the proposed standards. See Jodi Wilgoren, Kansas Fight 
on Evolution Escalates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A11. 
12. See Peter Slevin, Battle on Teaching Evolution Sharpens, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 
2005, at A1; see also Ker Than, Anti-Evolution Attacks on the Rise, LIVE SCI., Sept. 27, 
2005, http://www.livescience.com/othernews/050927_ID_cases.html. 
13. See Than, supra note 12 (documenting pending legislation). Some of the 
legislation that calls for a critical teaching of evolution is modeled specifically 
after Senator Rick Santorum’s failed amendment to the No Child Left Behind Act, 
including a bill the South Carolina legislature will take up in January 2006. See 
Susan Spath, Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., Antievolution Legislation in South Carolina 
Again (June 17, 2005), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/2005/SC/ 
357_antievolution_legislation_in_s_6_17_2005.asp; see also Alberts, supra note 1; 
James Dao, Sleepy Election is Jolted by Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A12; 
Richard Fellinger, State Studies Intelligent Design, YORK DAILY REC., June 21, 2005, 
at C1. 
Although most intelligent design proponents argue vehemently that teaching 
intelligent design does not constitute teaching religion, not all legislators draw a 
clear line between science and religion. For example, Utah state representative 
Chris Buttars wants to require the teaching of “divine design,” requiring students 
to learn that the world was created by “a superior power.” Matt Canham, 
Evolution Battle to Flare Up in Utah: Backers of “Divine Design” Theory Want Equal Time 
in Schools, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 6, 2005, http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_2777333. 
Buttars originally planned to introduce a bill to this effect when the Utah legislature 
returns in January 2006 but has since indicated he instead will introduce it in the 
2007 session if science teachers who teach evolution are not “dealt with” by the state 
board of education. See Mark Canham, Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., “Divine Design” 
Legislation in Utah on Hold (July 21, 2005), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/news/ 
2005/UC374_divine_design_legislation_in_7_21_2005.asp; Mary Beth Schneider & 
Robert King, GOP Lawmakers Want Schools to Teach “Intelligent Design,” 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 3, 2005, at 1A (noting support from Indiana legislators 
and from the electorate for teaching intelligent design). 
14. See Peter Baker & Peter Slevin, Bush Remarks on “Intelligent Design” Theory 
Fuel Debate, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A1; Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Remarks 
Roil Debate over Teaching of Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at A14.  
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concept of intelligent design is science and should be taught in 
the spirit of teaching both sides of a controversy; (2) the theory 
of evolution is hostile to religion, thus intelligent design should 
be taught to preserve government neutrality towards religion; 
(3) a teacher’s ability to teach the concept of intelligent design 
is a matter of academic freedom.15 Because the intelligent agent 
or agents to whom all credit is given remain unidentified, intel-
ligent design proponents reject the suggestion that the concept 
is merely the newest iteration of biblically based creationism.16 
On the other side, opponents of intelligent design argue that 
because the concept of intelligent design is religious and not 
scientific, and because the theory of evolution is scientific and 
not religious, teaching intelligent design is motivated by an 
impermissible purpose to advance religion in public schools 
and generates an effect of advancing religion; such motive and 
result both violate the Establishment Clause.17 Accordingly, 
because intelligent design advocates’ purpose is nearly always 
less overtly religious than that of traditional creationists, dis-
cerning the government purpose that motivates an intelligent 
design policy is a crucial yet challenging aspect of intelligent 
design litigation. In fact, this analysis will be even more diffi-
cult after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McCreary 
County v. ACLU.18  
In June 2005, the Court issued decisions in two cases involv-
ing the public posting of the Ten Commandments on govern-
ment property. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court upheld as 
constitutional a six-foot-tall granite monument of the Ten Com-
mandments erected on the Texas state capitol grounds nearly 
forty years ago, focusing on the passivity of the monument’s 
message, the historical, secular meaning of the Ten Com-
mandments, and the longstanding, uncontroversial nature of 
the display at issue.19 In McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court 
rejected two Kentucky counties’ recent, repeated attempts to 
post the Ten Commandments inside their respective county 
courthouses, initially by posting the document alone and then 
                                                                                                                  
15. See, e.g., John H. Calvert, IDNet, Teaching Origins Science in Public Schools: 
Memorandum & Opinion (2001), http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/ 
legalopinion.htm. 
16. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
17. See id.; see also, e.g., Michelle Starr, Some Call Design a Step Toward Balance, 
YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 19, 2005, at A1.  
18. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
19. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
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as part of larger displays.20 McCreary County utilized the initial, 
and rarely determinative, aspect of the three-prong Establish-
ment Clause test the Court set forth in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man: “First, the [government action] must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [third, it] 
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”21  
While McCreary County thus reconfirmed the primacy of the 
Lemon test’s government purpose analysis, Van Orden entirely 
disregarded the Lemon test. Whether read individually or taken 
together, these two cases amplify the confusion that attends 
Establishment Clause doctrine, an area of law prominent schol-
ars have described as chaotic and largely incoherent, and that a 
district court characterized, in the wake of McCreary County 
and Van Orden, as beset by “utterly standardless” distinctions.22  
This chaos is due in part to the “objective observer” or “rea-
sonable observer” test, a legal fiction created and championed 
by Justice O’Connor.23 This objective, reasonable observer has 
served the courts in Establishment Clause cases as an arbiter of 
a statute or policy’s effect, or as a measurer of degree of en-
dorsement.24 Originally, the objective observer was cast as a 
well informed hypothetical member of the community, and 
thus provided a rough response to the implied question arising 
from the Lemon test: “Effect upon, or endorsement as perceived 
by, whom?” The objective observer matured over time, but al-
ways operated within the context of the effects-endorsement 
analysis. Then, McCreary County imported the objective ob-
                                                                                                                  
20. McCreary County v. ACLU, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2001); 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 686–88 (E.D. Ky. 2000). 
21. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
22. See, e.g., Newdow v. Congress, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1244 n.22 (E.D. Cal. 
2005); see also Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging 
Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 
PEPP. L. REV. 681, 686 n.31 (2001) (collecting scholarly comments from Thomas 
Berg, Jesse Choper, John Garvey, Leonard Levy, Marci Hamilton, John Mansfield, 
and Antonin Scalia regarding the “incoherence and inconsistency” of the 
Establishment Clause cases). This doctrine has become such a quagmire that 
another district court, attempting to reconcile and apply McCreary County and Van 
Orden, suggested that the “context driven inquiry” applied by Justice Breyer as 
the swing vote in Van Orden effectively evaluates the reasonable observer’s 
perspective of whether government action created an endorsement of religion. 
Twombly v. City of Fargo, 388 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990 (D.N.D. 2005). 
23. See infra Part III.B.1. 
24. See id. 
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server’s perspective into the government purpose analysis, an 
area previously reserved to the courts and characterized by an 
evaluation of a government actor’s actual purpose.25 In 
McCreary County, the Court delineated the new boundaries of 
the government purpose inquiry: “[T]he eyes that look to pur-
pose belong to an ‘objective observer’ . . . .” and if a religious 
motive is hidden “so well that the ‘objective observer . . .’ can-
not see it, then without something more . . . it suffices to wait 
and see whether such government action turns out to have . . . 
the illegitimate effect of advancing religion.”26 Given the con-
stantly changing nature of Establishment Clause doctrine, it is 
unclear whether this newly expanded role of the reasonable 
observer is a definitive change or merely a temporary shift. Ei-
ther way, the emerging set of evolution-intelligent design con-
troversies illustrates some difficulties courts will encounter 
should they choose to interpret and apply McCreary County 
strictly. 
Bearing in mind that a reasonable observer brings an increas-
ingly extensive knowledge of issues of law to any analysis, the 
second Part of this Article explores the ideas at the root of these 
controversies—evolution, creationism, and intelligent design—
and reviews the public perceptions that underlie the evolution-
intelligent design debate. The third Part analyzes the line of 
cases giving rise to the reasonable observer as an analytical tool 
employed by a majority of the Court, and charts the reasonable 
observer’s changes over time. These cases set the stage for a 
discussion of McCreary County, which both refocuses Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine on government purpose and alters 
the purpose analysis by invoking the distanced perspective of 
the reasonable observer.  
The fourth and final Part considers the potential impact of 
McCreary County on intelligent design disputes and ultimately 
argues for a limited application of McCreary County. Strictly 
read, McCreary County changes the fundamental constitutional 
harm in an Establishment Clause case from actual government 
purpose to perceived government purpose, resulting in a 
slightly different formulation of this factor that is both overin-
clusive and underinclusive. McCreary County also vests the rea-
sonable observer with increasingly vast knowledge of issues of 
law (in some cases an education law specialist’s command of 
                                                                                                                  
25. See infra Part III.C. 
26. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2734–35 (2005). 
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NCLB), yet insufficient knowledge of issues of fact. Lastly, it 
requires a uniformly de novo standard of review for federal 
appellate courts’ inquiries into government purpose without 
sufficient justification for expanding the scope of review. Given 
the value of an actual purpose inquiry and undesirable conse-
quences resulting from the shift to a perceived purpose in-
quiry, the Court should retrace some of its steps, as it has done 
in this area before, and refocus on government purpose with-
out the aid of the reasonable observer.  
The evolution-intelligent design debates raise several note-
worthy legal issues. This Article is intentionally limited to a 
focus on the government purpose analysis; set aside for the 
moment are the questions of effect and endorsement, as well as 
coercion and the related importance of Lee v. Weisman.27 
II. AN EVOLUTION-INTELLIGENT DESIGN PRIMER 
The evolution-intelligent design debates are marred by a 
misunderstanding of the ideas involved, science’s frequent hos-
tility towards religion, and Western religions’ resistance to con-
ceiving of nature itself as divine.28 As discussed later in this 
Article, after McCreary County, courts should evaluate govern-
ment purpose in an intelligent design case from the perspective 
of the reasonable observer who presumably is not omniscient 
and certainly is not typical, but who will be vested with exten-
sive knowledge. In the Dover case, for example, the court-
created reasonable observer had an even more extensive un-
derstanding of intelligent design than is presented here.29 Be-
cause the reasonable observer will be presumed to have a 
proper understanding of the ideas underlying any present con-
troversy, this Part revisits the theory of evolution and the con-
cepts of creationism and intelligent design, complex ideas too 
often characterized in sound-bite definitions. Then, because the 
reasonable observer is deemed to be operating in a social con-
                                                                                                                  
27. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  
28. See KENNETH R. MILLER, FINDING DARWIN’S GOD: A SCIENTIST’S SEARCH FOR 
COMMON GROUND BETWEEN GOD AND EVOLUTION 19, 57 (1999). 
29. See generally Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714–35 
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (conducting an endorsement test and employing the reasonable 
observer); id. at 735–46 (discussing whether intelligent design is science and 
concluding that the reasonable observer would reach the same conclusion as the 
court). 
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text, the Part assesses the current climate of public opinion re-
garding evolution, creationism, and intelligent design.  
A. Revisiting the Ideas at Issue 
1. Evolution 
Credit for the theory of evolution is in large part properly at-
tributed to Charles Darwin’s 1859 work On the Origin of Species 
and his 1871 tome Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to 
Sex.30 Darwin’s Origin of Species was revolutionary because it 
argued that species of flora and fauna do not permanently exist 
in their present forms. Rather, they vary over time as individ-
ual members develop inheritable adaptations to their natural 
environments that make them more likely to survive than 
members of the same species that have not changed or have 
changed in less advantageous ways. Mutations upon mutations 
lead to diversification within, and eventually among, species.31  
The next major intellectual leap in this area, the Neo-
Darwinian Synthesis, took shape in the 1940s and proposed 
that species’ adaptations result in better suited individuals hav-
ing more offspring that survive at a higher rate, and that varia-
tions within a species are inherited specifically through 
individual organisms’ genetic code.32 Scientists continue to find 
significant support for the theory of evolution and the Neo-
Darwinian Synthesis in the fossil record, which confirms that 
extinct organisms are found in older layers of rock, that living 
organisms have become more complex over time, and that dif-
                                                                                                                  
30. Darwin was the first scientist to explore this idea in such depth, but he was 
not the first to consider the concept of species’ change over time. See MILLER, supra 
note 28, at 32–36 (summarizing the earlier scientific work of William Smith, 
Georges Cuvier, and Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire). 
31. See George Levine, Introduction to CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 
BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION xvii, xxiv, xxvi (George Stade, ed., Barnes & 
Noble 2004) (1859) [hereinafter DARWIN, ORIGIN]; see also ERNST MAYR, WHAT 
EVOLUTION IS 75, 116 (2001). Humans were not included in this concept of 
evolution through natural selection until Descent of Man. Hamilton Cravens, 
Introduction to CHARLES DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION 
TO SEX ix, xi (Barnes & Noble 2004) (1871). 
32. See generally MAYR, supra note 31. The Neo-Darwinian Synthesis considered 
Darwin’s work in concert with that of geneticist Gregory Mendel and naturalist 
Alfred Russell Wallace. It resulted mostly from the work of John Burdon 
Sunderson Haldane, Ronald Fischer, Theodosius Doebzhansky, and Julian 
Huxley. See id. 
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ferent species today can be traced back through mutations to 
common ancestors.33  
Evidence supporting the theory of evolution always has been 
questioned, in part because such critical questioning is the 
backbone of science, and, in this case, also because of the the-
ory’s perceived social, moral, and religious ramifications. From 
the start, Darwin’s theory was the target of criticism because it 
ran counter to a literal interpretation of the Genesis creation 
story, in which God individually created plant and animal spe-
cies. That criticism grew in force when the theory of evolution 
gained support from advances in genetics. From the perspec-
tive of religious adherents to creationism and intelligent de-
sign, the danger presented by the theory of evolution is that if 
humans were not specially created by God and in the image of 
God, then there is no reason to expect humans to behave dif-
ferently from amoral animals.34 Or, in the words of a letter read 
by Representative Tom DeLay on the floor of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, tragedies such as the 1999 school shooting in 
Columbine, Colorado happen in part because “[o]ur school sys-
tems teach the children that they are nothing but glorified apes 
who have evolutionized out of some primordial soup of 
mud . . . .”35 As its name suggests, Darwin’s Origin of Species 
limited itself to a discussion of inter- and intra-species diversi-
fication, sidestepping the issue of living things’ ultimate ori-
gins.36 Though the theory of evolution is hardly the only 
scientific concept with potential consequences for religious 
                                                                                                                  
33. See id. at 13, 22. Evidence of responsive mutation is not limited to fossils; 
scientists today document such mutation in viruses and bacteria that develop 
drug resistance. See TIM M. BERRA, EVOLUTION AND THE MYTH OF CREATIONISM 53 
(1990). 
34. See ELDREDGE, supra note 1, at 10; KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 92 (2005). As stated by John Buell, president and academic 
editor of the Foundation for Thought and Ethics, in a 1995 fundraising letter,  
The current deplorable condition of our schools results in large part from 
denying the dignity of man created in God’s image. Even junior high 
students recognize that if there is no creator, as textbooks teach, then 
there is no law giver to whom they must answer, and therefore no need 
of a moral lifestyle, much less a respect for the life of their fellow man. 
The message of the foundation is that this is simply unacceptable. 
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 6 AM, at 101. 
35. Chet Raymo, Darwin’s Dangerous De-evolution, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1999, 
at C2; Coyne, supra note 3, at 33. 
36. Levine, supra note 31, at xviii.  
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faith,37 it has been a constant target of religiously driven criti-
cism for the past 150 years. 
Since Darwin’s time, many scientists and theologians have 
argued that evolution and religion are compatible, despite fre-
quent antagonism between the two perspectives. Some scien-
tists, such as Brown University biology professor Kenneth 
Miller, have published books reconciling the theory of evolu-
tion with religious belief.38 Alan Leshner, chief executive of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, has 
commented that “the theory of evolution does not, in fact, con-
flict with the religious views of most Jewish, Christian, Muslim, 
Buddhist, or Hindu followers.”39 The official statements of reli-
gious leaders reinforce Leshner’s assertion, including Pope 
John Paul II’s 1996 Message on Evolution to the Pontifical Academy 
of Sciences, which echoed Pope Pius II’s 1950 theistically quali-
fied statement that there is “no opposition between evolution 
and the doctrine of the faith about man and his vocation . . . .”40 
                                                                                                                  
37. As noted by a federal district court, there are religious implications to “the 
theories of gravity, relativity, and Galilean heliocentrism . . . .” Selman v. Cobb 
County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2005).  
38. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 28; see also David Barton, A Death-Struggle 
Between Two Civilizations, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 297, 310 n.63 (2000); George 
Johnson, For the Anti-Evolutionists, Hope in High Places, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at 
A3; Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, Aug. 15, 2005, at 34. 
39. Cornelia Dean, Opting Out in the Debate on Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2005, at F1. 
40. Pope John Paul II, Message on Evolution to the Pontifical Academy of 
Sciences (Oct. 23, 1996), http://www.catholic.net/RCC/Periodicals/Inside/01-
97/creat2.html; see also Lawrence M. Krauss, School Boards Want to “Teach the 
Controversy”: What Controversy?, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at F3; Cornelia Dean, 
Evolution Takes a Back Seat in U.S. Classes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at F1. 
The current Pope, Benedict XVI, has made similar statements, although the 
Archbishop of Vienna questioned public interpretation of the Catholic Church’s 
endorsement, provoking a minor controversy in July 2005. On July 7, 2005, 
Cardinal Christopher Schönborn, Archbishop of Vienna, expressed in a New York 
Times editorial that “[e]volution in the sense of common ancestry might be true, 
but evolution in the neo-Darwinian sense—an unguided, unplanned process of 
random variation and natural selection—is not.” Christopher Schönborn, Finding 
Design in Nature, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A23. Scientists and others called for 
Pope Benedict XVI to clarify the Church’s position and reaffirm the earlier 
statements of John Paul II and Pius II. See Lawrence M. Krauss, Francisco Ayala, & 
Kenneth Miller, Letter to Pope Benedict XVI (July 12, 2005), http://genesis1.phys. 
cwru.edu/~krauss/papalletttxt.htm; see also Cornelia Dean, Scientists Ask Pope for 
Clarification on Evolution Stance, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A18; Cornelia Dean & 
Laurie Goodstein, Leading Cardinal Redefines Church’s View on Evolution, N.Y. 
TIMES. July 9, 2005, at A1. On November 3, 2005, Monsignor Gianfranco Basti, the 
director of the Catholic Church’s Science, Theology and Ontological Quest project, 
and Cardinal Paul Poupard, the director of the Pontifical Council for Culture, 
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The Presbyterian Church (USA) and the Lutheran World Fed-
eration have issued official statements accepting the theory of 
evolution, as has the American Jewish Congress.41 Similarly, 
the Unitarian Universalist Association and the United Method-
ist Church oppose the teaching of creationism in public 
schools.42 Moreover, a “Creator” merited several mentions in 
Darwin’s Origin of Species, including the book’s very last sen-
tence: 
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers 
having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few 
forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cy-
cling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so sim-
ple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most 
wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.43 
 The scientific and cultural import of this theory hardly can 
be overstated.44 Today, the scientific community is nearly 
unanimous in its acceptance of the theory of evolution and its 
view of the importance of this theory.45 Nevertheless, despite 
this widespread acceptance, only twenty-seven states’ public 
school science standards received a passing grade for their 
treatment of evolution in a December 2005 report from the 
                                                                                                                  
reiterated the Church’s support of science, and evolutionary theory in particular. 
See Nicole Winfield, Vatican: Faithful Should Listen to Science, USA TODAY.COM, 
Nov. 3, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/ethics/2005-11-03-vatican-
science_x.htm. 
41. National Center for Science Education, Statements from Religious Organizations 
(Dec. 19, 2002), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/7445_statements_from_ 
religious_org_12_19_2002.asp. 
42. Id. 
43. DARWIN, ORIGIN, supra note 31, at 384. 
44. Harvard biology professor emeritus Ernst Mayr has called evolution “the 
most important concept in biology.” MAYR, supra note 31, at xiii. A federal district 
court recently recognized evolution as “the dominant scientific theory regarding 
the origin of the diversity of life . . . accepted by the majority of the scientific 
community.” Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005). 
45. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the 
Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 804 nn.234–35 (2003) 
(collecting statements from prominent scientists regarding the overwhelming 
support for the basic tenets of the theory of evolution, and reflecting an 
understanding of its role as a central concept of modern scientific knowledge); 
Michael Powell, Pa. Case Is Newest Round In Evolution Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 
27, 2005, at A3. 
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nonprofit Fordham Foundation; in 2000, thirty-one states had 
received a passing grade for their evolution-related standards.46  
2. Creationism 
In constitutional law, “creationism” has become a term of art 
to describe the beliefs of so-called young-earth creationists, 
who date the age of the earth from the chronology suggested in 
the Bible and conclude the earth is only 5,000 to 10,000 years 
old.47 Young-earth creationists reject evidence that the earth is 
approximately 4.5 billion years old by arguing that the Noa-
chian flood led to the appearance of a fossil record because the 
organisms that could escape to higher ground or otherwise 
survive the inundation did so and those left behind gradually 
became buried in sediment.48 Other young-earth creationists 
argue that this flood altered chemical and biological processes 
to the point that contemporary scientific methods of dating fos-
sils and various artifacts are entirely inaccurate.49 Young-earth 
creationists often concede the apparent age of the earth, fossils, 
and even surrounding cosmos, while maintaining that the real 
age of these things is much less, and they were merely created 
to look older.50  
As their name suggests, old-earth creationists concede the 
earth to be billions of years old. They maintain that God indi-
vidually created “kinds” of plants and animals sequentially 
over great spans of time, and that God works through biologi-
cal processes to create diversity within species.51 Both groups 
rely on the Genesis account to support their claim that God 
created all species separately from one another, particularly 
                                                                                                                  
46. PAUL R. GROSS, THE STATE OF SCIENCE STANDARDS 2005 at 7, 25 (2005), 
available at http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/Science%20Standards.Final%20(12-6). 
pdf. 
47. See Francis J. Beckwith, Science and Religion Twenty Years After McLean v. 
Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 460–61 (2003); see also MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S 
BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION 5 (1996). 
48. See generally JOHN C. WHITCOMB, JR. & HENRY M. MORRIS, THE GENESIS 
FLOOD: THE BIBLICAL RECORD AND ITS SCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS (1961). This work 
is summarized in MILLER, supra note 28, at 61. 
49. See generally GEORGE MCCREADY PRICE, THE NEW GEOLOGY (2d ed. 1923); 
WHITCOMB & MORRIS, supra note 48. 
50. MILLER, supra note 28, at 79–80. 
51. Eugenie C. Scott, Science, Religion, and Evolution, in EVOLUTION: 
INVESTIGATING THE EVIDENCE 361, 372 (1999), available at http://www.ncseweb.org/ 
resources/articles/528_science_religion_and_evoluti_6_19_2001.asp. 
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focusing on the distinct creation of humans. Thus, all creation-
ists reject the idea of common descent, the theory that existing 
plants and animals evolved from simpler organisms. Teaching 
either form of creationism, or “creation science,” in a public 
school science class has consistently been found to violate the 
Establishment Clause.52  
3. Intelligent Design 
Although creationists’ arguments generally are based on a 
literal or barely interpretive reading of Genesis and are thus 
fairly well defined, there is less clarity and even greater varia-
tion among the arguments presented by intelligent design pro-
ponents.53 This complicates the evolution-intelligent design 
debates further and ultimately makes a government purpose 
inquiry more difficult and fact-specific. Unlike creationists, 
many of intelligent design’s scientific advocates do not dispute 
that the Earth is billions of years old or that humans and apes 
have a common ancestor.54 In fact, some intelligent design ad-
vocates accept the legitimacy of the fossil record as well as cor-
responding theories in geology and physics.55 The concept of 
intelligent design, however, is significantly different from ap-
proaches taken by evolutionary theists.  
One of two scientific legs on which the concept of intelligent 
design stands is the idea of “irreducible complexity.” Lehigh 
University biochemistry professor Michael Behe advances this 
argument,56 which in a significant sense rekindles the argument 
presented in 1802 by William Paley in Natural Theology. Paley 
argued that even in their most basic forms, various organisms 
(or organs) are so complex that they could not have resulted 
from evolution alone and exist only because they are the direct 
products of an intelligent designer, a Creator.57  
                                                                                                                  
52. E.g. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
53. See, e.g., Michael Powell, Washington Post Staff Writer, Online Discussion: The 
Evolution Debate, (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/ 
discussion/2005/10/04/DI200510040217_pf.html; see also Laurie Goodstein, Witness 
Defends Broad Definition of Science, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A15; Mike Argento, 
Intelligent Design’s Plea for Help, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 25, 2005, at A8.  
54. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 10 PM, at 118.  
55. See MILLER, supra note 28, at 93, 164; see also WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, 
INTELLIGENT DESIGN 122–52 (1999). 
56. See generally BEHE, supra note 47. 
57. See WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY 44–45 (Boston, Gould & Lincoln 
1857). In Origin of Species, Darwin responded to Paley’s claim that the vertebrate 
eye must have been created in present form because it cannot function without all 
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In Behe’s book Darwin’s Black Box, one of the foundational 
works of the intelligent design movement, Behe contends that 
Darwin’s response is no longer adequate because of scientific 
advances that have occurred since Darwin’s death.58 Thus, the 
theory of evolution deserves to be revisited. Behe argues that 
advances in biochemistry during the 1950s enabled scientists to 
study organisms at the molecular level, leading to an under-
standing that the cell is an irreducibly complex organism that 
requires all of its components to function and therefore cannot 
be created piecemeal through a process of evolution.59 Because 
natural selection can favor only working systems, a cell cannot 
be produced through natural selection if it lacks any of its nec-
essary components, which are not working systems in their 
own right. Accordingly, the cell’s components could not exist 
independently, let alone be preserved and refined through 
natural selection on their own.60 Behe argues not only that an 
intelligent designer created the first irreducibly complex organ-
ism, a bacterium cell, but also that this cell was packed with 
genes that would not become active for billions of years and 
had the genetic ability to lead to all subsequent life forms.61 
What evolution advocates perceive to be the random process of 
evolution, intelligent design proponents contend was actually 
genetically predestined. Significantly, Behe rejects the idea that 
                                                                                                                  
of its various parts. MILLER, supra note 28, at 135 (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, THE 
ORIGIN OF SPECIES 187 (Coth ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1956) (1872)). What Paley 
assumed was irreducibly complex, Darwin said was in fact not, because earlier 
versions of that eye would have had evolutionary value if they resulted in any 
new or better sensory ability, and thus that eye could have been protected and 
honed through natural selection, evolving from a less complex version of itself. 
BEHE, supra note 47, at 211–16. 
Harvard professor and evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould, and American 
Museum of Natural History curator and evolutionary paleontologist Niles 
Eldridge, have proposed a more recent alternate evolutionary answer to the 
question Paley poses. They argue that, rather than occurring slowly over time as 
Darwin suggested, evolution occurs in bursts when an organism develops a new 
characteristic through random mutation that is significantly beneficial; then the 
new characteristic changes quickly, resulting in rapid diversification. This is the 
theory of punctuated equilibrium. MAYR, supra note 31, at 193, 270. 
58. BEHE, supra note 47, at 10. 
59. Id. 
60. Behe explains that a tangible example of an irreducibly complex system is a 
mousetrap, which needs all of its components to function (the hammer, spring, 
catch, holding bar, and platform), and whose components do not have other 
functional value by themselves. Id. at 4–5, 39. 
61. In other words, the genetic code for all of the rest of the organisms that have 
ever and will ever exist was packed into the first bacterium. MILLER, supra note 28, 
at 162 (quoting BEHE, supra note 47, at 227–28). 
 434 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 29 
the mechanism of natural selection, with its focus on chance 
and adaptation, determined the development of species, yet he 
does not propose a specific, step-by-step mechanism in its 
place.62  
The concept of intelligent design may appeal to evolutionary 
theists, particularly because some of the scientists affiliated 
with the intelligent design movement accept parts of the theory 
of evolution. These two approaches, however, sit on either side 
of the only true dividing line in the evolution-creationism con-
tinuum as described by National Center for Science Education 
director Eugenie Scott.63 That is, the theory of evolution relies 
on natural processes to influence change among and within 
species, although evolution’s adherents disagree about the de-
gree to which a divine being was or is involved in determining 
the laws of nature that dictate those natural processes.64 Impor-
tantly, evolution’s adherents agree that the process of evolution 
is a separate issue from the existence and form of a divine be-
ing.65 In contrast, intelligent design advocates contend that the 
issues are inseparable: The irreducible complexity of organs or 
organisms only can be explained by the existence and involve-
ment of an intelligent designer (whom they do not specifically 
identify). Furthermore, because these issues cannot be disen-
tangled, evolution’s silence about divinity is viewed as hostility 
towards religion.66 
To the frustration of the scientific community, the irreducible 
complexity argument posed by Behe and echoed by some of his 
fellow advocates—that the diversity of species and existence of 
humans must be attributed to an omniscient, omnipotent de-
signer because of the flaws in the theory of evolution—is a hy-
                                                                                                                  
62. See Laurie Goodstein, Witness Defends Broad Definition of Science, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2005, at A15; Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 11 PM, at 
84–87. 
63. See Eugenie C. Scott, Nat’l Center for Science Educ., The Creation/Evolution 
Continuum (Dec. 7, 2000), http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/9213_the_ 
creationevolution_continu_12_7_2000.asp. Brown University biology professor 
Kenneth Miller and Georgetown University theology professor emeritus John Haught 
have testified that they understand the concept of intelligent design to be, in Miller’s 
words, “a classic form of creationism known as special creationism.” Transcript of 
Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 PM, at 43–45; see also id., Day 5 PM, at 10. Behe 
rejects this characterization. Id., Day 10 AM, at 87.  
64. See Kenneth L. Woodward, Evolution as Zero-Sum Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2005, at A15. 
65. See id. 
66. Lest the reader wonder, the Author considers herself an evolutionary theist. 
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pothesis that cannot be tested, unlike the theory of evolution 
which has been tested continually for the past 150 years.67 
There is little debate about the unpopularity of intelligent de-
sign in the scientific community: The number of scientists who 
advance intelligent design is small,68 the overwhelming major-
ity of scientists reject the concept of intelligent design,69 and the 
science supporting intelligent design continues to be almost 
entirely absent from peer-reviewed journals.70 While intelligent 
design proponents view their exclusion from scientific journals 
as reflecting a bias against their ideas, many scientists suggest 
                                                                                                                  
67. Professor Steve Fuller from the University of Warwick, England testified 
that intelligent design is a concept “too young” to have generated sufficient 
methods of being tested. Fuller was an expert witness for the school district. 
Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 15 AM, at 86; see also Lauri Lebo 
& Michelle Starr, Witness: Intelligent Design Needs Boost, YORK DAILY REC., Oct. 25, 
2005, at A1; MILLER, supra note 28, at 126. In 2002, the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) concluded that intelligent design should not 
be taught in schools because the intelligent design movement had “not proposed a 
scientific means of testing its claims.” Media Matters for America, Religious 
Conservatives Tout “Intelligent Design” as a “Secular,” “Scientific” Alternative to 
Evolution (Dec. 21, 2004), www.mediamatters.org/items/200412210002. Given the lack 
of a significant intervening publication record, it seems likely the AAAS would 
reach the same conclusion today.  
Behe, however, argues that it is evolution that is not easily falsifiable, and that 
intelligent design is, by comparison, significantly more testable. Transcript of Trial 
Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 10 AM, at 86. 
68. For a listing of scholars involved in the intelligent design movement, a 
chronicle of the half-dozen books published in this area, and a summary of 
academic and public debate generated by the intelligent design movement, see 
Francis J. Beckwith, Science and Religion, supra note 47, at 470–77 & nn.50–112; 
Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of 
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461, 462–65 & nn.4–23 
(2003). See also Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on the Horizon of Darwinism: 
Teaching the Anthropic Principle and Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 63 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1507, 1595 (2002); Wexler, supra note 45, at 804 & n.233. 
69. See Wexler, supra note 45, at 236. 
70. Behe notes that he published a peer-reviewed intelligent design article in 
2004 in Protein Science. See Michael J. Behe & David W. Snoke, Simulating Evolution 
by Gene Duplication of Protein Features that Requires Multiple Amino Acid Residues, 13 
PROTEIN SCI. 2651 (2004); see also Laurie Goodstein, Expert Witness Sees Evidence in 
Nature for Intelligent Design, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at A14. But see Coyne, supra 
note 3, at 31 (writing after the publication of Behe’s article and noting the absence 
of intelligent design articles from scientific peer-reviewed journals); Wexler, supra 
note 45, at 807 n.237 (collecting sources supporting this conclusion). Steven C. 
Meyer’s paper The Origin of Biological Information and the Higher Taxonomic 
Categories is the only intelligent design argument published in a peer-reviewed 
scientific journal, but the journal later issued a statement that the article did not 
receive proper peer review and failed to satisfy the journal’s scientific standards. 
See Coyne, supra note 3, at 31. 
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that to the extent intelligent design papers are even submitted, 
they are rejected because they are bad science.71  
As noted, Behe’s irreducible complexity argument is one of 
the two primary scientific bases supporting the intelligent de-
sign movement. The other argument, an odds-based approach, 
has been developed by Southern Baptist Theological Seminary 
professor and mathematician William Dembski. This approach 
begins by searching for a “sufficiently complex” pattern of 
events or system in nature and then seeks to rule out scientific 
necessity or chance as the cause of the complexity: in other 
words, establishing the odds of the likelihood of the system 
coming into existence randomly as prohibitively low.72 This 
approach, too, makes the scientific aspects of the concept in-
separable from the existence of an intelligent designer.  
Aside from Behe, Dembski, and a few others,73 most of intel-
ligent design’s visible proponents are not scientists or even 
academics. Missouri attorney John Calvert is the co-founder of 
the Intelligent Design Network, an organization dedicated to 
advocating intelligent design instruction in schools.74 Calvert 
has given legal advice to school districts and state boards of 
education in more than ten states over the past six years; many 
of his opinion letters about state science standards and science 
curricula are readily available on the Internet.75  
Although Calvert frequently cites to Behe’s and Dembski’s 
work, other advocates of intelligent design present a view of 
intelligent design more overtly tied to religion. In an interview 
in December 2004, Albert Mohler, president of the Southern 
Baptist Theological Seminary, stated:  
I believe in creation, in a full biblical doctrine of creation. I’m 
a Christian theologian . . . . But the theory of intelligent de-
sign comes down to this. In the entire complexity of the uni-
verse as we know it, from something as complex as the 
                                                                                                                  
71. Wexler, supra note 45, at 805–07. 
72. See Calvert, supra note 15, at 10–14. 
73. Most of the research supporting intelligent design is connected with the 
Seattle-based nonprofit think tank the Discovery Institute. The organization’s web 
site is http://www.discovery.org. 
74. The organization’s web site is http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org. 
75. Calvert has advised school boards or state boards of education in Kansas (in 
1999 and in 2005), Missouri, Ohio, West Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, New 
Mexico, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota. Letter from John H. Calvert to Darby, 
Montana School Board (Feb. 19, 2004), at 1–2, available at 
http://www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/DarbyBoardOpinion.pdf. 
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human eye to the glory of the sky and all the cosmos, all the 
planets and their proportion, there is more information nec-
essary there than the theory of evolution can explain.76  
Similarly, University of California law professor Phillip John-
son has explained his role as the primary legal architect of the 
intelligent design movement: “I wanted to redefine what is at 
issue in the creation-evolution controversy so that Christians, 
and other believers in God, could find common ground in the 
most fundamental issue—the reality of God as our true crea-
tor.”77 Johnson has commented elsewhere that “[w]ith the suc-
cess of intelligent design . . . we’re going to understand that, 
regardless of the details, the Christians have been right all 
along—at least on some major elements of the story, like divine 
creation.”78 Terry Fox, pastor of a Wichita, Kansas Southern 
Baptist Church attended by 6,000 people each week, character-
izes intelligent design as a temporary compromise for creation-
ists: “The strategy this time is not to go for the whole enchilada. 
We’re trying to be a little more subtle.”79 Even Dembski, one of 
the movement’s two key scientists, has characterized intelligent 
design as “the Logos of John’s Gospel restated in the idiom of 
information theory.”80 And, when the early intelligent design 
primer Of Pandas and People was in its initial stages of devel-
opment, it was replete with references to “creationism” that 
were ultimately replaced by “intelligent design” before the 
book’s publication.81 
In keeping with their denial that intelligent design is crea-
tionism in disguise, intelligent design advocates consistently 
frame the debate as a contest between two scientific theories: 
                                                                                                                  
76. Media Matters for America, supra note 67. 
77. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DEFEATING DARWINISM BY OPENING MINDS 92 (1997). 
78. Mark Hartwig, The Meaning of Intelligent Design, BOUNDLESS WEBZINE, July 
18, 2001, http://www.boundless.org/2000/features/a0000455.html. See also Phillip 
E. Johnson, Starting a Conversation About Evolution, Access Research Network, 
(Aug. 31, 1996), http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/ratzsch.htm. 
79. Peter Slevin, Battle on Teaching Evolution Sharpens, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 
2005, at A1. 
80. Barbara Forrest, Intelligent Design?, 111 NAT. HIST. 73, 80 (Apr. 2002). See also 
William A. Dembski, Introduction: Mere Creation, in MERE CREATION 13, 28–29 
(1998).  
81. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 721–22 (M.D. Pa. 
2005); see also Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 6 AM, at 108, 117–
26. 
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evolution and intelligent design.82 Despite critics’ characteriza-
tion of this dualism as, for example, “not unlike recommending 
that mustard plasters and bleeding be taken as seriously as an-
tibiotics and heart-bypass surgery,”83 this approach of positing 
intelligent design as the single alternative to evolution appears 
to have had some success. After Ohio adopted new state sci-
ence standards in 2002 that called for a critical teaching of evo-
lution, a member of the Ohio Board of Education reported 
receiving calls from school districts saying they were “allowing 
students to openly debate intelligent design” and that students 
were researching intelligent design.84 Similarly, a federal dis-
trict court wrote in January 2005 that “[b]y denigrating evolu-
tion, the School Board appears to be endorsing the well-known 
prevailing alternative theory, creationism or variations thereof, 
even though the [statement] does not specifically reference any 
alternative theories.”85  
The idea that an intelligent designer influenced the creation 
of human beings necessarily raises the question of the identity 
of the designer or designers. It is in this respect that intelligent 
design seems to its critics most like creationism in sheep’s 
clothing, particularly because many of intelligent design’s 
strongest proponents are fundamentalist Christians. Much to 
the chagrin of many intelligent design proponents, Behe, Cal-
vert, and others take great pains to explain that the intelligent 
designer who created the first cell is not necessarily the Judeo-
Christian God or any other God, but in fact could be, as the dis-
                                                                                                                  
82. In 2001, Calvert referred to intelligent design as “one of the only two 
possible answers,” claiming that “[e]vidence contradicting the Darwinian theory 
is, by default, evidence that supports the Design Hypothesis . . . because design 
detection requires the elimination of chance and necessity as the explanatory 
cause.” Calvert, supra note 15, at 12, 27. In 2004, Calvert correspondingly advised 
a school board that “any discussion of evolution necessarily involves a usually 
unstated premise about intelligent design. The core claim of modern evolutionary 
theory is that life is not designed.” Calvert, supra note 75, at 2. See also Evan Ratliff, 
The Crusade Against Evolution, WIRED, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.wired. 
com/wired/archive/12.10/evolution.html. But cf. Beckwith, supra note 47, at 489. 
The plaintiffs in the Dover, Pennsylvania case refer to this as a “contrived 
dualism” reminiscent of the “evolution science”-“creation science” pairing set 
forth in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
at 29, Kitzmiller, No. 4:04-CV-02688 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2005).  
83. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Foreword to GROSS, supra note 46, at 9. 
84. Terry Phillips, State Issues Producer, Focus on the Family—Citizen Link, Ohio 
Paves Way in Evolution Debate, (Dec. 13, 2002), http://www.sciohio.org/sbe1015.htm. 
85. Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 
2005). 
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trict court in the Dover, Pennsylvania trial skeptically noted, “a 
space alien or a time-traveling cell biologist.”86 This concession 
is necessary given proponents’ claim that intelligent design is 
not advancing religious beliefs. Despite this admission, evolu-
tion’s supporters—both people of faith and not—vigorously 
criticize intelligent design as a religion-driven concept.87 The 
district court in the Dover trial reached essentially the same 
conclusion in December 2005:  
After this searching and careful review of [intelligent de-
sign] as espoused by its proponents, as elaborated upon in 
submissions to the Court, and as scrutinized over a six week 
trial, we find that [intelligent design] is not science and can-
not be adjudged a valid, accepted scientific theory as it has 
failed to publish in peer-reviewed journals, engage in re-
search and testing, and gain acceptance in the scientific 
community. [Intelligent design], as noted, is grounded in 
theology, not science.88 
B. The Cultural Context, at Home and Abroad 
The evolution-intelligent design battles evoke strongly per-
sonal reactions from participants and observers alike because 
the central question often perceived to be at issue is the origin 
of the human species. Although Americans are split between a 
belief in evolution or in creationism, citizens of other Western, 
industrialized countries do not present the same division, nor 
do they have the adamant exclusion of creationism from school 
curricula required by the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause.89 
For at least the past quarter-century, Americans have been 
fairly evenly divided between belief in the theory of evolution 
and in the concept of creationism. A September 2005 Gallup 
Poll confirmed that the division has remained roughly con-
stant: Thirty-one percent of Americans believe humans evolved 
                                                                                                                  
86. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 718; see also Calvert, supra note 15, at 6 n.9. 
87. The words differ, but the sentiment is consistent: Intelligent design is an 
“invent[ion]” of creationism, Mackenzie, supra note 10, at 8, “creationism in a lab 
coat,” Ratliff, supra note 82, at 158, “the most highly evolved form of creationism 
to date,” id. at 202 or “a thinly veiled effort to dress up creationism as 
science . . . ,” Media Matters for America, supra note 67. 
88. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 745. 
89. For a discussion of how classification as an Establishment Clause issue 
ratchets up a controversy, see generally Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century 
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 427–28 (2002). 
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from other life forms with divine assistance, twelve percent be-
lieve humans evolved from other life forms without divine as-
sistance, and fifty-three percent of Americans believe humans 
were created directly—“as is”—by a divine being at some point 
within the past 10,000 years.90 Thus, in 2005 the split between 
evolution and creationism was fifty-three to forty-three in favor 
of creationism, a shift from 2004, when the split was fifty-one to 
forty-five in favor of evolution, and 2001, when the split was 
forty-seven to forty-five, again in favor of evolution.91 As the 
margin of error is three percent and these responses generally 
are consistent with Gallup Poll results tracked since 1982,92 it is 
fair to conclude that Americans’ beliefs about evolution and 
creationism have remained more or less stable across varying 
                                                                                                                  
90. CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, Sept. 8–11, 2005, available at http://www. 
pollingreport.com/science.htm. 
91. National Center for Science Education, Public View of Creationism and 
Evolution Unchanged, Says Gallup (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.ncseweb.org/ 
resources/news/2004/US/724_public_view_of_creationism_and_11_19_2004.asp; 
Deborah Jordan Brooks, Gallup News Service, Poll Release: Substantial Numbers 
of Americans Continue to Doubt Evolution as Explanation of Origin for Humans 
(Mar. 5, 2001), http://www.unl.edu/rhames/courses/current/creation/evol-poll.htm. 
The participants were asked, “Which of the following statements comes closest to 
your views on the origin and development of human beings: 1) Human beings 
have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God 
guided this process, 2) Human beings have developed over millions of years from 
less advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process, 3) God created 
human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000 
years or so?” Options one through three were rotated to eliminate rank bias.  
A 2001 National Science Foundation survey is one of the few to claim that a 
majority (fifty-three percent of Americans) accepts the theory of evolution. 
Cornelia Dean, Evolution Takes a Back Seat in U.S. Classes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, 
at F1, F6. About eighty percent of people in industrialized nations accept the 
theory of evolution, as do approximately seventy-five percent of people in 
heavily-Catholic Poland and ninety-six percent of people in Japan. Id.  
92. Brooks, supra note 91; CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, supra note 90. 
Responses to the Gallup Poll from 1982 through 2001 are as follows: 
 Humans 
developed, 
with God 
guiding  
Humans 
developed, but 
God had no 
part in process  
God created 
humans in 
present form 
Other 
(volunteered)/ 
no opinion 
Sept. 2005    31%    12%    53%    4% 
Nov. 2004 38 13 45 4 
Feb. 2001 37 12 45 6 
Aug. 1999 40 9 47 4 
Nov. 1997 39 10 44 7 
June 1993 35 11 47 7 
1982 38 9 44 9 
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Presidential administrations, economic conditions, and phases 
of domestic and foreign policy. Additionally, because nearly 
half of the adult population in the 2005 and 2004 surveys was 
too young to have been represented in the 1982 survey, the 
general consistency of the data also suggests that the input 
from schools and places of worship has been, on average, no 
more or less convincing to young and middle-aged Americans 
over the past twenty-five years than it was to their parents’ 
generations. With Americans evenly divided between evolu-
tion and creationism,93 it is not surprising that science teachers 
often shy away from teaching the theory of evolution, even ab-
sent any official state or local restrictions.94  
Creationism and intelligent design advocates are more en-
trenched and effective domestically than abroad.95 In England, 
where some state schools regularly use instructional time for 
religious education and observance, the national curriculum 
                                                                                                                  
93. The Gallup data may slightly overestimate evolution’s support, according to 
other polls. A November 2004 CBS News poll found that only forty percent of 
Americans self-identify as evolutionists, a combination of twenty-seven percent 
stating evolution has been divinely guided and thirteen percent stating evolution 
was unguided. See POLL: CREATIONISM TRUMPS EVOLUTION, CBSNews.com, Nov. 
22, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/22/opinion/polls/main657083.shtml. 
The July 2005 Harris Poll also reached similar conclusions, finding only thirty-
eight percent of Americans think humans evolved from earlier species, although 
forty-nine percent of Americans agree generally that plants and animals evolved 
from earlier species. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, NEARLY TWO-THIRDS OF U.S. ADULTS 
BELIEVE HUMAN BEINGS WERE CREATED BY GOD (2005), http://www.harris 
interactive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=581.  
94. A February 2005 Education Week article summarized these recent studies:  
A survey of teachers in Oklahoma, conducted in 1999, found that about 
25 percent of public school life-science teachers placed at least moderate 
emphasis on creationism, or the biblical belief that God created the 
universe, in their classes. Forty-eight percent believed strong scientific 
evidence exists for creationism, the study found . . . [I]n Minnesota, a 
survey of first-year biology students at the University of Minnesota-Twin 
Cities reported that only 38 percent said their high school biology courses 
had emphasized evolution. Twenty percent of those students said their 
courses had emphasized creationism, according to that 2004 study. 
Similar polls dating back to the 1980s, from states such as Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and South Dakota, closely mirror these results. 
Sean Cavanagh, Teachers Torn over Religion, Evolution, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 2, 2005, at 
1, 18. 
95. See Nicholas Wade, Long-Ago Rivals Are Dual Impresarios of Darwin’s Oeuvre, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at F2. Whether this gap will remain so wide is unclear. 
One indication of intelligent design’s momentum is Eastern Europe’s first 
conference on the topic, which was held in October 2005 and drew more than 700 
attendees. Ondrej Hejma, “Intelligent Design” Supporters Gather, LANCASTER-
ONLINE.COM, Oct. 24, 2005, http://ap.lancasteronline.com/6/czech_intelligent_ 
design. 
 442 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 29 
calls for a robust teaching of evolution.96 Select English schools 
teach creationism in addition to evolution, though this practice 
appears tied to the requests of private benefactors.97 The na-
tional curricula of Ireland, Northern Ireland, France, and Can-
ada similarly focus on evolution and leave little room for 
creationism or intelligent design, even in publicly funded, re-
ligiously affiliated schools.98 The Catholic Church in France 
strongly supports teaching evolution, emphasizing the distinc-
tion that “[e]volution is a scientific theory; creation is a mean-
ing . . . .”99 Similarly, Serbian Orthodox bishops spoke out in 
opposition after the state briefly banned the teaching of evolu-
tion in September 2004.100 Australia is the outlier in the Western 
industrialized world, permitting its public schools to teach evo-
lution, creationism, or both.101 Two non-Western countries that 
do not teach evolution are Turkey, which instructs students in 
creationism in elementary and secondary public schools and 
where an intelligent design movement is beginning to take 
root, and Pakistan, where evolution is no longer taught in uni-
versities.102 This, then, is the background for a debate that is 
starting to see the inside of federal courtrooms, and likely will 
do so with increasing frequency. 
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT QUAGMIRE 
 Often in tension and sometimes serving as a direct check 
upon one another, the First Amendment’s two religion clauses 
read, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”103 In 1947, 
the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education that the Estab-
lishment Clause applied to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.104 Since that time, the Court’s religion cases have 
                                                                                                                  
96. It is the exception rather than the rule for even a religiously affiliated school 
in England to teach creationism in a class other than religion. See Michelle Galley, 
Evolution Theory Prevails in Most Western Curricula, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 28, 2004, at 8.  
97. MacKenzie, supra note 10, at 9. For example, the school financed by Peter 
Vardey, Christian fundamentalist and millionaire car dealer, includes instruction 
in creationism. Id. 
98. Galley, supra note 96, at 8. 
99. Id. at 8. 
100. Mackenzie, supra note 10, at 9. 
101. Galley, supra note 96, at 8. 
102. Mackenzie, supra note 10. 
103. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
104. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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come to constitute some of its most complex and unpredictable 
jurisprudence. As the Court euphemistically noted in McCreary 
County v. ACLU, “Establishment Clause doctrine lacks . . . cate-
gorical absolutes.”105  
 Over the past twenty years, because of the endorsement test 
Justice O’Connor introduced in Lynch v. Donnelly,106 evaluating 
the perspective of the “objective observer” or “reasonable ob-
server” gradually has become part of the analysis of a govern-
ment action’s effect. Although Justice O’Connor linked the 
purpose and effect prongs of the three-prong Lemon v. Kurtz-
man107 test under the larger question of endorsement, neither 
her earlier concurrences nor opinions by other members of the 
Court suggest that the government’s purpose should itself be 
evaluated only from the perspective of a reasonable observer. 
Thus, McCreary County is notable because it reinforces the pri-
macy of a government purpose analysis, while also declaring 
the objective observer to be the sole arbiter of government pur-
pose. An analytical distinction between the purpose and effect 
prongs as conceived in Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test 
may have been delicate—indeed, it remains unclear whether 
the endorsement test is a replacement for the Lemon test or 
merely a new iteration of the effects prong—but until McCreary 
County, the Court at least persisted in drawing a clear technical 
distinction between the purpose and effect analyses when it 
employed them. As McCreary County is the Court’s most recent 
pronouncement about government purpose, it will be relevant 
in pending and forthcoming Establishment Clause cases when 
the speech at issue is not purely passive, such as the teaching of 
the concept of intelligent design in public schools. 
A. The Life of Lemon 
 In 1971, the Court set forth its well known three-part Estab-
lishment Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.108 Even today, it is 
with reference to this gatekeeping test that nearly all Estab-
lishment Clause analyses by lower courts begin.109 Lemon held 
                                                                                                                  
105. 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 n.10 (2005). 
106. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
107. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
108. Id. 
109. Again, the predominance of the Lemon purpose and effect analysis likely 
has more to do with lower courts’ understandable confusion about the proper 
standard (and thus they rely upon the last coherent moments of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence) than with the presence of a definitive test. See, e.g., Peck v. 
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that to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, the govern-
ment action in question must (1) have a secular legislative pur-
pose; (2) result in a primary effect that is neutral towards 
religion, neither favoring nor inhibiting it; and (3) not create an 
excessive entanglement between government and religion.110 
The Court and commentators alike acknowledge that while 
Lemon no longer has the full support of a majority of the Court, 
Lemon’s ideological successor has yet to be anointed.111 Al-
though frustrating to those who mine these cases in search of 
guiding precedent, the Court’s almost haphazard use of or en-
tire disregard for the Lemon considerations is now standard.  
 As the Court noted in McCreary County, the government 
purpose prong of Lemon has rarely been invoked to invalidate a 
government statute or policy. More often than not, the Court 
has accepted the government’s stated secular purpose as con-
stitutionally sufficient.112 Some scholars even have speculated 
that the Court might abandon the secular purpose test alto-
gether.113 Such speculation was not unwarranted before 
McCreary County, particularly because only five of the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause cases have held a statute or pol-
icy to be constitutionally infirm because of an impermissible 
government purpose.  
 In Epperson v. Arkansas in 1968, the first case in which the 
Court found a statute to be unconstitutional because of its im-
permissible purpose, the Court struck down a statute prohibit-
                                                                                                                  
Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 04-4950-CV, 2005 WL 2649472, at *14 (2d Cir. 
Oct. 18, 2005); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), aff’g Glassroth v. 
Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002); DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. 
Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405–06 (2d Cir. 2001). In some cases, such as Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area School District, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005), the parties concede 
that the Lemon test is controlling. Kitzmiller, Memorandum and Order (M.D. Pa. 
Sept. 13, 2005) (denying Defendant Dover Area School District’s motion for 
summary judgment).  
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted McCreary County as “reaffirming” the 
Lemon test. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2005). Although 
McCreary County does not replace the Lemon test, to say that it reaffirms that test 
overstates the holding of McCreary County and the consistency of Establishment 
Clause doctrine. 
110. 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
111. See, e.g., Addicott, supra note 68, at 1518; Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The 
Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 
328; Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 
499, 499–503 (2002). 
112. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 97–98 (2002). 
113. See id. at 98. 
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ing the teaching of evolution.114 Twelve years later, in Stone v. 
Graham, the Court rejected a school district’s efforts to post a 
copy of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, 
despite the project’s being privately financed and the Ten Com-
mandments’ bearing a small disclaimer about the secular value 
of the text.115 In 1985, the Court in Wallace v. Jaffree declared un-
constitutional a state statute “authorizing a one-minute period 
of silence in all public schools for meditation or voluntary 
prayer,” which replaced a state statute permitting a mere mo-
ment of silence with the use of that time unspecified.116 Then, in 
Edwards v. Aguillard, decided in 1987, the Court rejected a man-
datory “balanced treatment” approach to teaching evolution 
and “creation science.”117 Eighteen years passed before the 
Court again struck down government action because of an ille-
gitimate purpose in its 2005 decision in McCreary County.  
 Particularly since Lemon, Establishment Clause doctrine has 
become increasingly fractured, assuming unpredictable and 
ever-changing forms. 
B. The Objective, Reasonable Observer: At First  
an Evaluator of Effect and Endorsement 
 The objective, or reasonable, observer first appeared in an Es-
tablishment Clause case in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984118 and gradually became a part of the 
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine as a means for evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of a government action’s effect. The 
Court first adopted the general idea of considering whether 
government action created an apparent endorsement of relig-
ion, and later specifically adopted the reasonable observer 
analysis.  
1. Emerging in Justice O’Connor’s Concurrences 
 In Lynch, the Court held 6-3 that a city did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause when it included a crèche in its annual out-
door Christmas display, which also featured reindeer, images 
                                                                                                                  
114. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
115. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
116. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
117. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The statute stipulated that if evolution was taught, 
“Creation-Science” must be taught as well. There was no statutory or other 
requirement, however, to teach either concept. 
118. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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of Santa Claus, and strings of small colored lights.119 The Court 
concluded that the crèche was constitutionally permissible as 
part of a public holiday celebration, despite its religious nature. 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor introduced a “clarifica-
tion” to Lemon that since has become known as the endorse-
ment test.120 Specifically, Justice O’Connor proposed that a 
court consider both “the intention of the speaker”—the subjec-
tive government purpose—and “the ‘objective’ meaning of the 
statement in the community”—its effect.121 If the government’s 
actual purpose was improper, the statute or policy could of-
fend the Constitution notwithstanding its effect; likewise, an 
effect of appearing to endorse religion could invalidate a stat-
ute or policy regardless of a constitutionally proper intent.  
In this formulation, a court would view the purpose of the 
government as speaker from its own judicial perspective and 
shift its focus to the perspective of the reasonable observer 
when evaluating the perceived effect. As Professor Timothy 
Zick describes the initial endorsement test, “there [were] two 
symbolic meanings in play—the meaning to a potential in-
sider . . . ,” the government’s subjective purpose, “and the 
meaning to a potential outsider . . . ,” the perceived effect of the 
statement in the community.122 While the objective observer 
eventually would become the heart of the endorsement test, at 
this point the concept remained shadowy and ill defined.123  
 One year later, a slightly more articulated objective observer 
appeared in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree. 
The Court’s decision was again 6-3,124 this time concluding that 
an Alabama statute permitting a moment of silence or volun-
tary prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause 
because of an impermissible government purpose.125 The 
Court’s analysis of government purpose was demanding, re-
viewing the two predecessors to the statute at issue (one per-
                                                                                                                  
119. Id. at 671–72. 
120. Although Justice O’Connor consistently situated her endorsement test as 
the newer version of the Lemon test, scholars split on whether the test is merely an 
interpretation of Lemon or an alternative to it altogether. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Quo 
Vadis, supra note 111, at 360. 
121. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
122. Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a 
First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2370 (2004). 
123. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
124. Five justices formed the majority opinion and Justice O’Connor concurred 
in the judgment. 
125. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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mitting a moment of silence and the other authorizing teacher-
led prayer) and concluding that the religious purpose that mo-
tivated the first two statutes also motivated the third.126  
 Justice O’Connor’s concurring analysis of government pur-
pose in Wallace expressed caution and deference to the gov-
ernment’s stated purpose, finding an impermissible religious 
motivation only because “it is beyond purview that endorse-
ment of religion or a religious belief ‘was and is the law’s rea-
son for existence.’”127 Then turning to the separate question of 
the statute’s effect, Justice O’Connor contended that the rele-
vant question was “whether an objective observer, acquainted 
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the 
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement” of religious 
activity.128 From her perspective, the Alabama statute failed the 
endorsement test, too, because the religious purpose was 
transparent and would be clear to an objective observer.129 In 
this concurrence, the effects portion of Justice O’Connor’s en-
dorsement test began its slow collapse into the government 
purpose portion of the same test. Because the objective ob-
server in Wallace is aware of the same facts regarding legisla-
tive intent as is the Court (and will become even more so over 
time), the objective observer and the Court must reach the 
same conclusion about government purpose.130 If not, it is ei-
ther because the Court lacks objectivity in its analysis,131 or be-
cause it has failed to endow an objective observer—a construct 
of its own creation—with sufficient knowledge so that it would 
reach the same conclusion as the Court. Neither option is 
likely.  
2. The Early Stages of Adoption 
 In 1989, the Court split 5-4 in an opinion suggestive of the 
McCreary County-Van Orden pairing, reaching seemingly incon-
sistent decisions arising from a set of similar circumstances. In 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Court held that a county’s 
display of a crèche inside the courthouse constituted an im-
                                                                                                                  
126. Id. at 56–60. 
127. Id. at 75, (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U.S. 97, 108 (1968)).  
128. Id. at 76. 
129. Id. at 78. 
130. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 293–94 (1987). 
131. Id. 
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permissible establishment of religion, while the county and 
city’s outdoor display of a menorah next to a Christmas tree 
did not.132 From the perspective of some scholars and Justices, 
this shift in the Court’s theoretical framework marked the point 
where Establishment Clause doctrine went from bad to 
worse.133 In County of Allegheny, the plurality first set forth the 
Lemon test and commented that its recent focus had been on the 
first two prongs of Lemon: government purpose and effect, or 
endorsement.134 Then, the Court favorably cited part of Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test as proposed in Lynch, Wallace, 
and other cases, and neatly shoehorned its precedent into the 
effects-endorsement concept. In the Court’s words, “[w]hether 
the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the 
essential principle remains the same.”135  
 Not all members of the majority joined Justice Blackmun’s 
entire opinion, but a majority did adopt the concept of evaluat-
ing the effect of a government action by considering (appar-
ently from a judicial perspective) whether the government 
action created an apparent endorsement of religion. The por-
tion of Justice Blackmun’s opinion applying the perspective of 
the reasonable observer did not garner a majority, though as 
Justice Stevens noted a few years later, five Justices subscribed 
to the concept of a reasonable person evaluating whether the 
policy created an endorsement of religion, if not the reasonable 
person.136 In particular, Justice Brennan set forth contradictory 
factual conclusions, both of which could be reached by reason-
able people, and rejected the idea that the reasonable person 
could only reach one conclusion: namely, the conclusion set 
forth by the plurality.137  
 The reasonable observer gained additional definition in Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurrence in County of Allegheny, which ex-
                                                                                                                  
132. 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989). 
133. See, e.g., id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(the “test is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice”); LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1293 (2d ed. 1988); Smith, supra note 
132, at 293–94; Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 
711–12 (1986). 
134. 492 U.S. at 592–93. 
135. Id. at 593. 
136. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 n.4 
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 
(Blackmun, J., writing for the plurality); id. at 635–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
and id. at 642–43 (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
137. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 642–43 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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panded the reasonable observer’s base of knowledge further 
still. In particular, Justice O’Connor explained that both the 
“history and ubiquity” of a publicly displayed religious symbol 
matter to a reasonable observer, because these factors compose 
part of the context a reasonable observer would consider when 
determining whether there is a perceived endorsement.138 In 
this manner, County of Allegheny set the stage for the Court’s 
extensive examination of historical context via the reasonable 
observer in Santa Fe139 and in McCreary County. Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in County of Allegheny focused almost 
exclusively on whether the displays had the impermissible ef-
fect of creating an apparent endorsement of religion; the gov-
ernment’s apparent purpose was one part of this consideration, 
but Justice O’Connor took the stated purpose at face value and 
did not probe it further.  
 In 1995, the Court juggled the First Amendment’s two relig-
ion clauses and held 7-2 in Capitol Square Review & Advisory 
Board v. Pinette that Establishment Clause concerns did not 
permit the municipal board to deny the Ku Klux Klan’s request 
to temporarily display a cross in the ten-acre plaza surround-
ing the Ohio state capitol building.140 While explicitly stating it 
was not applying the endorsement test, the Court held that be-
cause the cross was private speech not attributable to the gov-
ernment, there could be no perceived government endorse-
ment of a religious message.141 Because the Board had permit-
ted rallies and other unattended displays in the same area by 
various community groups, including religious groups, the 
Court determined that government neutrality towards religion 
mandated granting the Ku Klux Klan’s request.142 A majority 
endorsed the reasoning just described, but the portion of Jus-
tice Scalia’s opinion rejecting the endorsement test was joined 
by only three other Justices.  
                                                                                                                  
138. Id. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The question under the endorsement 
analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would view such longstanding 
practices as a disapproval of his or her particular religious choices, in light of the 
fact that they serve a secular purpose rather than a sectarian one and have largely 
lost their religious significance over time.”). 
139. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
140. 515 U.S. 753. Although the holding was 7-2, only four Justices, including its 
author, signed on to the entire opinion. See id. at 757.  
141. Id. at 763–64, 770. 
142. Id. at 757–58, 760–61. 
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 Justice O’Connor concurred in part in Capitol Square, writing 
separately to defend the endorsement test and acknowledge 
the distinct analyses of government purpose and effect.143 No-
tably, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence gained the support of 
Justices Souter and Breyer for the objective (now “reasonable, 
informed”) observer who evaluates whether the government 
action has the effect of appearing to endorse religion.144 Al-
though Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens both employed 
the analytical framework of the reasonable observer, they 
reached different conclusions about the ultimate question of 
whether a reasonable observer would perceive the Klan’s cross 
as an endorsement of religion. Justice O’Connor acknowledged 
that the reasonable observer “is presumed to possess a certain 
level of information that all citizens might not share.”145 Justice 
Stevens responded that because this reasonable observer was 
presumed to know the Court’s holding in Capitol Square before 
it was issued, Justice O’Connor’s reasonable person would 
need to be a “well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-
law model.”146 Justice O’Connor admitted her reasonable ob-
server has extensive knowledge of the history and context of 
the state action, but denied vesting the reasonable observer 
with sophisticated knowledge of First Amendment law.147 Jus-
tice O’Connor also criticized Justice Stevens’s misapplication of 
the reasonable observer as a mere “casual passerby.”148  
3. The Objective, Reasonable Observer Accepted 
 In 2000, a majority of the Court agreed that when it considers 
whether government action has created an endorsement of re-
ligion it will evaluate that question from the perspective of the 
reasonable observer. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe,149 the Court held 6-3 that a school board policy permitting 
student-led, student-initiated prayer, delivered over the public 
address system at a high school football game, constituted an 
impermissible establishment of religion. Focusing on whether 
the prayer would result in an actual or perceived endorsement 
                                                                                                                  
143. Id. at 773–74 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
144. Id. at 773. 
145. Id. at 780. 
146. Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
147. Id. at 778–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
148. Id. at 778–79. 
149. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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of religion (in other words, paying particular attention to the 
effect), the Court examined the perspective of an objective 
Santa Fe High School student regarding not only the “text and 
history” of the relevant school board policy, but also the deliv-
ery of a pre-game prayer.150 In this context, the Court approv-
ingly quoted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test as set forth 
in her Wallace concurrence, explicitly accepting the reasonable 
observer as the appropriate arbiter of any perceived endorse-
ment.151  
 It is unclear from the Court’s opinion whether the apparent 
endorsement alone was sufficient to invalidate the pre-game 
prayer or whether the Court’s consideration of perceived en-
dorsement may have been merely the first part of its evaluation 
in the coercion analysis imported from Lee v. Weisman.152 Even 
if the endorsement inquiry was merely another way of charac-
terizing the speech as not private speech but instead speech of 
the school that had the impermissible effect of coercing reli-
gious observance, Santa Fe adds to this body of law an adop-
tion of the reasonable observer as the judge of the speech’s 
effect. In its brief (and separate) government purpose analysis, 
the Court examined the text of the policy as well as the relevant 
history, concluding “it is reasonable to infer” that the policy 
was motivated by an impermissible purpose of advancing re-
ligion.153 This inference did not yet belong to the reasonable 
observer; it was still the purview of the Court. 
4. Applying the “Standard” 
 Examining an alleged effect of endorsement from the reason-
able observer’s perspective seemed routine by 2002 when the 
Court decided Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which upheld 5-4 
Ohio’s private school voucher and tutoring funding program 
against an Establishment Clause challenge.154 After a brief re-
view of the program’s historical context, the Court held that the 
state program was motivated by a secular purpose of provid-
ing better educational opportunities the poorest students in the 
                                                                                                                  
150. Id. at 307–08.  
151. Id. at 308. 
152. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). See Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa 
Fe Independent School District, 90 KY. L.J. 1, 28 n.163 (2002); see also Santa Fe, 530 
U.S. at 301–13. 
153. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309. 
154. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 452 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 29 
“demonstrably failing” 75,000-student Cleveland City School 
District.155 The Court then turned to the heart of the decision, 
an effect analysis that remained technically independent from 
the government purpose analysis. In reaching its ultimate con-
clusion that the program was not marred by an unconstitu-
tional effect, the Court first characterized and contextualized its 
precedent, stating, “[W]e have repeatedly recognized that no 
reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private 
choice, where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a re-
sult of the numerous independent decisions of private indi-
viduals, carries with it the imprimatur of government 
endorsement.”156  
 Foreshadowing McCreary County, Zelman’s conclusion about 
effect continued to blur the Court’s perspective and the reason-
able observer’s perspective of government intent.157 In the 
Court’s words, “[a]ny objective observer familiar with the full 
history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably 
view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor 
children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious 
schooling in general.”158 Zelman makes clear that, to the extent 
that the perceived government purpose is part of the policy’s 
effect, the objective observer must echo the Court’s conclusion.  
 Although the Court in Santa Fe had situated the reasonable 
observer as a high school student exposed to the pre-game 
prayer, in Zelman the Court returned to a more general view of 
reasonable observer as an adult community member. This re-
turn occurred despite the fact that the program’s vouchers 
were used almost exclusively to pay tuition for children to at-
tend parochial schools. Unlike the students in Santa Fe, who 
were attending a high school football game open to their par-
ents and other community members, the students in Zelman 
had a much greater opportunity than their parents or other 
community members to perceive endorsement: They were the 
ones attending the parochial schools and were the direct recipi-
                                                                                                                  
155. Id. at 644, 649. 
156. Id. at 654–55. Although the case the Court cited for this proposition, Mueller 
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), stands for this idea generally, Mueller was decided in 
1983, when Justice O’Connor was still the endorsement test’s only proponent.  
157. Although Professor Steven D. Smith noted this analytical collapse in his 
1987 article, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality 
and the “No Endorsement” Test, supra note 130, at 331, the Court’s opinions did not 
explicitly demonstrate the collapse in full until McCreary County. 
158. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655. 
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ents of religious instruction. In part, this return to the “objec-
tive observer as adult community member” model is necessary 
for the Court to reach the conclusion it does because an objec-
tive student in Zelman would likely perceive a greater degree of 
endorsement than did the Court and its reasonable observer. 
Furthermore, the return is consistent with the objective ob-
server as characterized in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Wallace and later opinions. As part of its admittedly practical 
“belt and suspenders” approach, the district court in the Dover, 
Pennsylvania case evaluated the intelligent design policy from 
the perspective of both the reasonable high school student and 
the reasonable adult community member.159 
 The last hint of Establishment Clause principles before 
McCreary County and Van Orden was in the Court’s 2004 deci-
sion in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, in which 
atheist father Michael Newdow challenged the school board 
policy and corresponding state statute requiring daily recita-
tion of the Pledge of Allegiance in his daughter’s school be-
cause the Pledge includes the words “under God.”160 Despite 
being decided on its merits at the district and appellate levels, 
the Supreme Court decided the case on procedural grounds, 
concluding that as a non-custodial parent, Newdow lacked 
standing to bring suit on his daughter’s behalf. Nonetheless, 
Justice O’Connor took the opportunity to champion the en-
dorsement test once again in her concurrence. Justice O’Connor 
focused on the effects aspect of the endorsement test, framing 
the question as “whether the ceremony or representation 
would convey a message to a reasonable observer, familiar 
with its history, origins, and context, that those who do not ad-
here to its literal message are political outsiders.”161 Again, the 
reasonable observer is not the five-year-old girl whose claimed 
injury was necessary to the lawsuit nor any other reasonable 
schoolchild, but rather an adult community member who em-
bodies “a community ideal of social judgment, as well as ra-
tional judgment . . . .”162 As in Zelman, the reasonable observer’s 
conclusion follows from what Justice O’Connor would have the 
Court conclude:  
                                                                                                                  
159. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714, 723, 729 (M.D. 
Pa. 2005). 
160. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
161. Id. at 43 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
162. Id. at 35. 
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[T]he relevant viewpoint is that of a reasonable observer, 
fully cognizant of the history, ubiquity, and context of the 
practice in question. Such an observer could not conclude 
that reciting the Pledge, including the phrase “under God,” 
constitutes an instance of worship . . . . A reasonable ob-
server would note that petitioner school district’s policy of 
Pledge recitation appears under the heading of “Patriotic 
Observances,” and the California law which it implements 
refers to “appropriate patriotic exercises.”163 
 Thus, from Lynch through Elk Grove, the perspective of the 
reasonable observer was increasingly employed to evaluate 
whether a perceived endorsement of religion resulted from a 
statute or policy. As Professor Kent Greenawalt noted ten years 
ago, “[t]he overall trend in [Justice O’Connor’s] opinions has 
been to pack more awareness of relevant factors into the rea-
sonable person.”164 That trend has continued, and today’s rea-
sonable observer is a veritable Jeopardy! champion. Even 
through Santa Fe and Elk Grove, however, the reasonable ob-
server was absent from the Court’s government purpose analy-
sis, which remained technically distinct from its effects analy-
sis. Then came McCreary County. 
C. McCreary County v. ACLU: An Objective, Reasonable 
Observer’s Perspective on Governmental Purpose 
 Because Establishment Clause doctrine is so splintered, the 
Court’s next moves regarding the reasonable observer are quite 
uncertain. A strict reading of McCreary County, such as is ad-
vanced in this Article, can lead to undesirable results, which 
are explored in the final Part of this Article. While it is impossi-
ble to predict the length of time between McCreary County and 
the Court’s next purpose-driven Establishment Clause case, it 
is likely that at least a few years will pass before McCreary 
County is formally affirmed in whole or in part, distinguished 
into irrelevance,165 or discarded outright. During that time, dis-
                                                                                                                  
163. Id. at 40–41. 
164. Greenawalt, supra note 111, at 372. 
165. Some lower courts already are reading the McCreary County-Van Orden 
distinction as focusing on the interior or exterior nature of the display without 
much regard for McCreary County’s emphasis on government purpose. See, e.g., 
ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 775–78 (8th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc); Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1172–73 (W.D. Wash. 2005); 
Russelberg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-CV-149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2175527, at 
*2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005). Others, such as the district court in the Dover, 
Pennsylvania case, employ both the endorsement test and Lemon’s purpose and 
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trict courts and courts of appeal will be bound by McCreary 
County and all of its unfortunate side effects. 
 In McCreary County, the Court again invoked the reasonable 
observer as the arbiter of endorsement but did not apply a tra-
ditional effect analysis. Instead, McCreary County is a decision 
driven by a government purpose analysis.166 Citing Santa Fe 
frequently, the Court demonstrated the degree to which it has 
conflated the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test, 
thereby depriving courts of the authority to evaluate govern-
ment purpose without involving the legal fiction of the reason-
able observer.  
 Focusing on the government purpose analysis allowed the 
Court to delve into the entire recent history preceding the gov-
ernment action at issue. In Wallace and Edwards, the Court 
made clear that the counties’ earlier actions were crucial in 
evaluating the constitutionality of their later actions. The tu-
mult began when two neighboring Kentucky counties posted 
functionally identical displays in the hallways of their individ-
ual courthouses. Each display was composed of a large, 
abridged copy of the Ten Commandments, including a biblical 
citation. The texts were unaccompanied by an explanation of a 
secular purpose. After a lawsuit was filed but before the district 
court acted on the plaintiffs’ request that the displays be re-
moved pending the outcome of the case, both counties’ elected 
governing boards approved resolutions to expand the exhibits. 
The second set of identical exhibits retained the copy of the Ten 
Commandments from the original displays and added eight 
other social and political documents with religious references, 
all in smaller frames, as well as explanations of why each 
document is part of Kentucky’s “precedent legal code.”167  
                                                                                                                  
effect inquiries, treating the analysis as though the reasonable observer’s 
analytical work is separate from the purpose analysis. See Kitzmiller v. Dover 
Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714 (M.D. Pa. 2005).  
166. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2728 (2005); see also 
O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2005).  
Plaintiffs in the Dover, Pennsylvania case asserted that even in McCreary 
County, “purpose evidence [is] relevant to the [endorsement] inquiry 
derivatively—just as it always was to Lemon’s effect analysis . . . .” Brief in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 13, 
Kitzmiller, No. 4:04-CV-02688 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2005). This interpretation 
misconstrues McCreary County, which does not adopt Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test wholesale, but rather explicitly frames its analysis as a 
government purpose inquiry under Lemon. 
167. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2727. In the Court’s words: 
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 The district court temporarily enjoined the first and second 
displays in both counties, determining that none was moti-
vated by a secular governmental purpose and that a reasonable 
observer would conclude that all the displays have the effect of 
appearing to endorse religion.168 A short while later—and 
without appealing the preliminary injunction—the two coun-
ties hung on their courthouse walls a third set of identical dis-
plays, entitled “The Foundations of American Law and 
Government.” These displays consisted of a longer version of 
the Ten Commandments, seven other documents (some of 
which were previously included in the second set of displays), 
a picture of Lady Justice, and statements explaining the signifi-
cance of each document.169 The district court held that the third 
displays, too, were impermissibly motivated by a government 
purpose of endorsing religion.170 The counties appealed this 
holding to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and, ultimately, 
to the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision and further stated that it considered the coun-
ties’ unrelenting defense of the displays in the present litigation 
to support the conclusion that they were motivated by a reli-
gious purpose.171 
 First setting forth the applicable law, the Supreme Court em-
phasized the importance of Lemon’s government purpose in-
quiry, noting that although the Court rarely strikes down a 
statute or policy as unconstitutional because of an illegitimate 
government purpose, the government purpose consideration 
                                                                                                                  
The documents were the “endowed by their Creator” passage from the 
Declaration of Independence; the Preamble to the Constitution of 
Kentucky; the national motto, “In God We Trust”; a page from the 
Congressional Record of February 2, 1983, proclaiming the Year of the 
Bible and including a statement of the Ten Commandments; a 
proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln designating April 30, 1863, a 
National Day of Prayer and Humiliation; an excerpt from President 
Lincoln’s “Reply to Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation 
of a Bible,” reading that “[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to 
man”; a proclamation by President Reagan marking 1983 the Year of the 
Bible; and the Mayflower Compact. 
Id. at 2729–30. 
168. ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 686–88 (E.D. Ky. 2000). 
169. ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 846–47 (E.D. Ky. 2001). 
The seven other documents were copies of the Magna Carta, the Mayflower 
Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights, the national motto, the lyrics to the Star Spangled Banner, and the preamble 
to the Kentucky Constitution. Id. 
170. Id. at 849–50. 
171. ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 449 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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has not diminished in importance.172 Describing the common 
theme of Establishment Clause doctrine as promoting “neutral-
ity between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion,” the Court explained that “[b]y showing a pur-
pose to favor religion, the government ‘sends the . . . message 
to . . . nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community, and an accompanying message to ad-
herents that they are insiders, favored members . . . .’”173 Thus, 
an apparent illegitimate purpose behind a government action 
can be enough to invalidate it.174 
 With this background, the Court declared, “The eyes that 
look to [government] purpose belong to an ‘objective observer,’ 
one who takes account of the traditional external signs that 
show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of 
the statute,’ or comparable official act.”175 This objective, rea-
sonable observer, as in cases before, considers the public record 
and bases his decision on “openly available data supported by 
a commonsense conclusion . . . .”176 Rather than being an “ab-
sentminded” individual limited to evaluating the present cir-
cumstance, the reasonable observer is “presumed to be familiar 
with the history of the government’s actions and competent to 
learn what history has to show.”177 Before McCreary County, the 
Court had often described this fictional reasonable observer, 
while also declaring that the reasonable observer was the 
proper judge of a statute or policy’s effect.178 The Court’s earlier 
cases, though, had not ceded to the reasonable observer the 
central role in interpreting government purpose. Thus, al-
though McCreary County did little to modify the characteristics 
of the reasonable observer, it swiftly and subtly altered the rea-
sonable observer’s fundamental function.179 
                                                                                                                  
172. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2732–33. 
173. Id. at 2733 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10 
(2000)). 
174. Id. at 2733–34. 
175. Id. at 2734 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308).  
176. Id. at 2735. 
177. Id. at 2737 (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308 and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 73 (1985)). 
178. See supra Part II.B. 
179. But see O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 
2005) (applying McCreary County and conducting an analysis of the government 
actor’s actual purpose rather than the apparent purpose as perceived by the 
objective observer). 
 458 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 29 
 Addressing the crux of the government purpose inquiry, the 
Court noted that although it generally defers to a stated gov-
ernment purpose, a secular government purpose must be pri-
mary and not merely a sham.180 However, McCreary County 
held that the perceived purpose is what ultimately matters. The 
Court rejected “a judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of 
hearts” and declared that “[a] secret motive stirs up no strife 
and does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it 
suffices to wait and see whether such government action turns 
out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the illegitimate 
effect of advancing religion.”181 In other words, there are limits 
to the government purpose inquiry, and they are the limits of 
the reasonable observer’s perceptions.182 Unlike the earlier ap-
plications of Lemon and iterations of the endorsement test in 
which there were two meanings at issue (the government’s 
subjective purpose and the objective or reasonable observer’s 
perception), the only meaning at issue after McCreary County is 
the perceived government intent. 
 After setting forth the applicable legal framework, the Court 
quickly reviewed and rejected the first displays—the solitary 
postings of the Ten Commandments—by noting the absence of 
any secular explanation: “The reasonable observer could only 
think that the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the 
Commandments’ religious message.” The Court characterized 
the second set of displays as “an indisputable, and undisputed, 
showing of an impermissible purpose . . . [that] the reasonable 
observer could not forget . . . .”183 The Court dismissed the ex-
planatory statements contained in the third set of displays as 
“only . . . a litigating position” and noted the absence of any 
further action by either county’s elected governing board.184 
Then, referring to the cumulative effect of the counties’ three 
sets of displays, the Court concluded, “If the [reasonable] ob-
server had not thrown up his [or her] hands, he [or she] would 
probably suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for 
any way to keep a religious document on the walls of court-
houses constitutionally required to embody religious neutral-
                                                                                                                  
180. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2735–36. 
181. Id. at 2734, 2735. 
182. Id. at 2726. 
183. Id. at 2738–39. 
184. Id. at 2740. 
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ity.”185 The temporal boundaries of the final display’s context 
are unclear, though the Court noted that a governmental 
body’s earlier actions do not “forever taint any effort on their 
part to deal with the subject matter.”186 Given that the displays 
in question were all erected within one year, some even after 
the lawsuit was filed, the Court properly left this question 
open.  
 Although the majority opinion focused on the reasonable ob-
server’s perspective on government purpose, Justice O’Con-
nor’s brief concurrence appeared to conflate further the gov-
ernment purpose and effect inquiries. She wrote without addi-
tional explanation, “The purpose behind the counties’ display 
is relevant because it conveys an unmistakable message of en-
dorsement to the reasonable observer.”187 This statement also 
could reflect a focus on effect; a subjective government purpose 
inquiry may still remain a separate analysis. Had the Court 
taken this approach, it would have by implication preserved its 
role as arbiter of the government purpose inquiry while con-
sidering the issue one of effect and endorsement, properly un-
der the purview of the reasonable observer.  
 Joined in full or in part by three other Justices, Justice Scalia 
dissented. He argued that the original intent—and thus the 
controlling interpretation—of the Establishment Clause was to 
prevent government from coercing participation in religion, 
not to prevent religion from being a part of public life.188 Justice 
Scalia criticized the majority’s focus on the apparent purpose of 
the government action rather than on the actual purpose: It 
was, he said, an ill advised departure from what he views as 
the wrongly decided Lemon test and its progeny. Under the 
Court’s new formulation, he argued, “the legitimacy of a gov-
ernment action with a wholly secular effect would turn on the 
misperception of an imaginary observer that the government of-
ficials behind the action had the intent to advance religion.”189 
Justice Scalia further criticized the majority opinion for “shift-
ing the focus of Lemon’s purpose prong from the search for a 
genuine, secular motivation to the hunt for a predominantly 
                                                                                                                  
185. Id. at 2741. 
186. Id.  
187. Id. at 2747 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
188. Id. at 2753–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in full, and Justice Kennedy joined in part. 
189. Id. at 2757. 
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religious purpose . . . ,” which can only be satisfied by “a rigor-
ous review of the full record.”190  
 Finally, Justice Scalia applied the majority’s test to conclude 
that there was no impermissible purpose apparent from the 
counties’ first, second, or third displays. As part of this analy-
sis, Justice Scalia echoed Justice Stevens’s opinion in Capitol 
Square, criticizing the majority’s presumptions about the 
knowledge imputed to the reasonable observer.191 This point of 
disagreement emphasizes that the Court’s reasonable observer 
is reasonable in a normative sense, as opposed to an empirical 
sense: Reasonableness is “what ought to be” rather than what 
is “typical.”192 As Professor Alafair Burke commented, “absent 
statistical evidence establishing the empirical reality, all deci-
sionmakers—whether Supreme Court justices, law professors, 
or jurors—are tempted to substitute their own judgment of rea-
sonableness both for the majority’s and for what is normatively 
‘right.’”193  
 To summarize at the risk of oversimplifying: 
 
Status of the Reasonable or Objective Observer 
Case Effect or Endorsement Government Purpose 
Lynch v.  
Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668 (1984) 
Justice O’Connor concurs, 
introducing the endorsement 
test, focusing on the “objec-
tive meaning of the statement 
in the community.” 
In the endorsement test, the 
reasonable observer does not 
evaluate actual government 
purpose. 
Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38 (1985) 
Justice O’Connor concurs, 
focusing on “whether the 
objective observer, ac-
quainted with the text, legis-
lative history, and 
implementation of the stat-
ute, would perceive it as a 
state endorsement” of relig-
ion. 
Justice O’Connor agrees with 
the Court that an impermissi-
ble actual government pur-
pose motivated the 
government action. 
County of  
Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 
A majority of the Court asks 
whether the government 
action creates an apparent 
In her concurrence, Justice 
O’Connor advances the en-
dorsement test and considers 
                                                                                                                  
190. Id. at 2758. 
191. In particular, Justice Scalia contended that the reasonable observer likely 
would not have known about the counties’ resolutions authorizing the first two 
displays, so the counties’ failure to rescind those resolutions would make no 
difference to the reasonable observer. Id. at 2758–59. 
192. See Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1043, 1052 (2005). 
193. Id. 
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573 (1989) endorsement of religion, but 
does not yet employ the rea-
sonable or objective observer. 
the apparent government 
purpose (not actual purpose) 
as one aspect of that test. 
Capitol Square  
Review & Ad-
visory Board v. 
Pinette, 515 
U.S. 753 (1995) 
A majority of the court ac-
cepts a, if not the, reasonable 
observer. Justices Souter and 
Breyer join Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence 
promoting the reasonable 
observer. Justice Stevens 
applies the reasonable ob-
server but reaches a different 
result. 
Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence acknowledges actual 
purpose and effect as distinct 
inquiries. 
Santa Fe  
Independent 
School  
District v. Doe, 
530 U.S. 290 
(2000) 
The Court evaluates whether 
the reasonable observer 
(here, an objective high 
school student at that school) 
would perceive an endorse-
ment of religion. 
The Court separately consid-
ers whether the policy was 
motivated by an impermissi-
ble purpose of advancing re-
ligion. 
Zelman v. 
Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 
639 (2002) 
The Court accepts the rea-
sonable observer in the form 
of an adult community 
member. 
The Court briefly evaluates 
whether the government was 
motivated by a secular pur-
pose. 
Elk Grove Uni-
fied School 
District v. 
Newdow, 542 
U.S. 961 (2004) 
Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence summarizes the rea-
sonable observer as “fully 
cognizant of the history, 
ubiquity, and context of the 
practice in question.” 
Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence does not delve into pur-
pose. 
McCreary 
County v. 
ACLU, 125 S. 
Ct. 2722 (2005) 
The Court imports the objective, reasonable observer from the 
effects-endorsement analysis into the government purpose 
inquiry. For the first time, it asks whether an objective observer 
would perceive that the government had an impermissible 
motive rather than focusing from its own perspective on 
whether the government had an actual impermissible motive. 
The Court frames its inquiry as a government purpose analy-
sis, not an effects-endorsement analysis. 
 
 Thus, the Court now has adopted the perspective of the rea-
sonable observer to evaluate not only whether a statute or pol-
icy has the effect of creating an apparent endorsement of 
religion, but also whether that statute or policy was motivated 
by an impermissible government purpose.  
D. Establishment Clause Considerations in Public School  
Curricular Debates 
 The Court has made clear that Establishment Clause doctrine 
is not beholden to the Lemon test, and it has at times disre-
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garded that test in its entirety.194 Before turning to an explora-
tion of the impact of Lemon-like McCreary County on the evolu-
tion-intelligent design debates, it is necessary to examine why a 
court is likely to apply McCreary County in these situations and 
also why Van Orden is likely to have little impact.195 
 First, when the Court last considered a case involving relig-
ion in the curriculum—in its 1987 decision in Edwards v. Aguil-
lard—it explored the government purpose in depth, ultimately 
concluding the stated secular purpose was a “sham” intended 
to conceal the religious purpose motivating the policy.196 Ed-
wards is one of only five Supreme Court cases in which an im-
permissible government purpose invalidated the state statute 
at issue.197 Edwards did not rely on a reasonable observer, and 
even if the Court had performed an effects analysis, it probably 
would not have employed an endorsement analysis because a 
majority of the Court did not accept that approach at the 
time.198 Thus, although McCreary County is the latest in the line 
of cases to invoke the concept of endorsement, it differs signifi-
cantly from its predecessors because it blurs the line between 
purpose and effect. As already discussed, McCreary County re-
shapes the government purpose analysis in light of a reason-
able observer’s perceptions.199 With its intense focus on 
                                                                                                                  
194. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion).  
195. Although the district court in the Dover, Pennsylvania case considered 
McCreary County, it viewed that case as employing the reasonable observer only 
as part of an endorsement analysis—not as the driving force in the government 
purpose analysis. The same court did not consider Van Orden. See Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (setting up the 
analytical framework for the opinion); id. at 716–35 (employing the endorsement 
test with the aid of the reasonable observer); id. at 746–65 (employing the 
government purpose analysis without the aid of the reasonable observer). 
As noted earlier, intelligent design cases will likely be controlled by the legal 
issues of government purpose, effect, endorsement, and coercion. This Article is 
limited to an exacting analysis of government purpose and effect. See supra Part 
III.D.  
196. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The Court did not reach the merits in Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 961 (2004), which involved the daily recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. The opinions of several justices indicate 
that Elk Grove would have been decided on much the same basis as Van Orden, 
because the secular cultural significance of the text “under God” has eclipsed its 
religious nature and thus a searching inquiry into government purpose is 
unnecessary. 
197. See supra Part III.A. 
198. See supra Parts III.B.2–3. 
199. See supra notes 172–93 and accompanying text. 
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discerning government purpose, McCreary County is Edwards’ 
logical successor.  
 Second, the Court’s opinions over time emphasize the sensi-
tivity with which lower courts should evaluate Establishment 
Clause questions affecting public elementary and secondary 
school students. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in 
Van Orden takes care to distinguish itself from the line of Estab-
lishment Clause cases arising out of educational settings. Van 
Orden reiterates the instruction in Edwards that the Court has 
been and should continue to be “particularly vigilant in moni-
toring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary 
and secondary schools” because “particular concerns . . . arise 
in [that] context.”200 Thus, courts are likely as a general matter 
to apply a more, rather than less, demanding test to situations 
involving public schoolchildren.201 Even though McCreary 
County reins in a government purpose analysis somewhat by 
limiting the review to the perspective of the reasonable ob-
server, the McCreary County standard is still more exacting than 
a test that asks only whether the state actor has coerced indi-
vidual religious belief or practice,202 or whether the religious 
nature of a statement has dissipated sufficiently over time to 
permit its display given the independent secular value of the 
statement.203  
 Third, a school curriculum is by its nature coercive, another 
factor making an in-depth analysis of government purpose ap-
propriate in that context.204 Although students are not forced to 
believe what they are taught in school, courts have long ac-
knowledged that the explicit purposes of public education in-
clude developing good citizens and perpetuating a common 
culture and set of beliefs.205 In contrast, Van Orden is the latest 
in a line of cases to hold that a noncoercive acknowledgement 
of this country’s Judeo-Christian heritage does not violate the 
                                                                                                                  
200. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863–64 (2005) (plurality) (quoting 
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584–85). 
201. See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 137 (2005). 
202. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).  
203. See, e.g., Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
204. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
205. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 864 (1982); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
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Establishment Clause. Much like the language “In God We 
Trust” on our nation’s currency or the sculpture of Moses with 
other law-givers in the Supreme Court courtroom, the Ten 
Commandments monument at issue in Van Orden is “pas-
sive.”206 As Justice Thomas elaborated in his concurrence, “In 
no sense does Texas compel petitioner Van Orden to do any-
thing. . . . He need not stop to read [the monument] or even to 
look at it, let alone to express support for it or adopt the Com-
mandments as guides for his life.”207  
A school curriculum requires active engagement, and is sig-
nificantly different from the passive message at issue in Van 
Orden. Although students who are taught concepts such as in-
telligent design are not required to accept the instructional ma-
terial as true, requiring belief is not the only manner in which a 
school can run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Even if intel-
ligent design is merely part of a statement read in a classroom, 
as it was in Dover, Pennsylvania, students must listen to their 
school officials declare intelligent design to be a valid, and per-
haps preferable, scientific concept. In other words, students 
must absorb a particular message about which idea they ought 
to accept as true.208 Depending on the extent to which intelli-
gent design is included in the curriculum, students could be 
required to read assigned materials, develop an understanding 
of the ideas presented, or demonstrate that understanding on a 
class test, if not on a statewide standards-based test that could 
take the form of a graduation requirement. The extent of in-
struction is not determinative of an Establishment Clause viola-
tion, however. As the plaintiffs’ attorney stated during the trial 
of the Dover intelligent design policy, “there is no such thing as 
a little constitutional violation.”209  
 Fourth and finally, the Court’s cases also note that the per-
ceived endorsement of religion is weaker if the religious activ-
ity is not school-sponsored and does not occur during school 
                                                                                                                  
206. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion).  
207. Id. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
208. As Professor Marci Hamilton has noted, schools’ actions have been held to 
violate the Establishment Clause when “the school send[s] a rather clear message 
to the students about what they should believe.” HAMILTON, supra note 201, at 
137. 
209. Transcript of Trial Proceeding, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 13 (plaintiffs’ 
opening statement). 
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hours,210 does not take place on school property,211 or does not 
result from a direct government-to-religiously-affiliated-school 
subsidy.212 When the policy at issue involves an action occur-
ring during the school day or at an official school event, the 
Court has invalidated the policy with greater frequency.213 
Given McCreary County’s merging of government purpose and 
effect inquiries, these considerations (earlier only found in the 
effect analysis) are now relevant to a government purpose 
analysis as well. Edwards, the case involving statutorily pre-
scribed “balanced treatment” of evolution and creationism in 
the classroom, contained one of the Court’s most invasive 
analyses of government purpose, perhaps second only to 
McCreary County.214 Even when considering McCreary County, 
the Court’s focus on government purpose seems to have had 
the most significant impact in cases involving public schools.215 
For these reasons, the Court’s precedent suggests that lower 
courts are likely to consider McCreary County in their evalua-
tion of government purpose in intelligent design disputes. 
IV. DON’T THROW THE BABY OUT WITH  
THE MCCREARY COUNTY BATHWATER 
 Many aspects of the current evolution debates sound famil-
iar, but judicial resolution of evolution-intelligent design con-
troversies has become even more complicated because of 
McCreary County’s altered focus in the realm of government 
purpose. The government purpose inquiry has long been criti-
cized by judges and scholars, but McCreary County declares de-
                                                                                                                  
210. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (permitting a 
non-school-sponsored religious organization to use school facilities after school 
hours on the same terms as nonreligious organizations). 
211. See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), overruling Aguilar v. 
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
212. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (permitting a state-
sponsored program to provide qualifying parents with vouchers for private 
school tuition and tutoring because of the private action necessary to use the 
public funds in religious schools). 
213. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a 
school district was not permitted to arrange for student-led religious prayer at 
school-sponsored football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding 
that a school district could not recruit a clergy person to deliver a 
nondenominational prayer at middle school graduation because of the coercive 
nature of the prayer). 
214. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
215. See Koppelman, supra note 112, at 153–54. 
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finitively that this inquiry is worth maintaining: “After declin-
ing the invitation to abandon concern with purpose wholesale, 
we also have to avoid the [government’s] alternative tack of 
trivializing the enquiry into it” by assuming the legitimacy of a 
stated government purpose.216  
 This Part contends that, because McCreary County will impact 
the government purpose analysis negatively if courts interpret 
and apply the case as this Article argues they are bound to do, 
the government purpose analysis should be preserved in its 
pre-McCreary County form: as a search for actual purpose with-
out the involvement of the reasonable observer.217 First and 
most obviously, when the government purpose inquiry moves 
from a search for actual purpose to speculation about apparent 
purpose, the result is both over- and under-inclusive. Second, 
the reasonable observer evaluating government purpose will 
be required to have an unreasonably vast command of issues of 
law, yet is confined by a more limited command of facts than 
those to which a court is privy. Third, because the formal na-
ture of the Court’s government purpose inquiry has moved 
from finding facts to reaching legal conclusions, the appellate 
standard of review will become uniformly de novo, even 
though the inquiry into government purpose is an essentially 
factual determination. The context of the intelligent design de-
bates illuminates this discussion.  
A. Changing the Constitutional Harm 
As the Court noted in McCreary County, the term “establish-
ment” is not self-defining,218 and so it falls to the courts to dis-
cern the meaning of the clause and then to distinguish action or 
intent that runs afoul of the Constitution from that which does 
not. Because McCreary County shifts the harm from a focus on 
the government’s actual purpose to its perceived purpose,219 
some behavior that would have offended the Constitution be-
fore no longer does so, and vice versa. The change may be 
                                                                                                                  
216. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735 (2005). For a thorough 
defense of the secular purpose requirement, see id. 
217. The eventual analytical result I advocate is roughly the same as the 
approach recently adopted by the district court in the Dover, Pennsylvania trial. 
See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 746, 747 n.20, 763 
(M.D. Pa. 2005). As explained in this Part, however, McCreary County does not 
support the district court’s specific approach. 
218. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2742. 
219. See supra Part III.C. 
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small and at the margins, but it is nonetheless a change in what 
constitutes a constitutional harm.  
1. What Apparent Intent Misses: Hidden Motives 
Although any motive-based inquiry to some extent encour-
ages burying improper purposes just deep enough that they 
will not be discovered,220 McCreary County creates even more 
hiding places for impermissible motives because of its newly 
required definitional deference to apparent government pur-
pose. The indeterminate depth of the reasonable observer’s in-
quiry (a problem in itself) also creates other problems: The 
reasonable observer’s assumptions about intelligent design in-
fluence the scope of the inquiry, and, by relying on traditional 
publicly available information (not all of which is necessarily 
reliable, including newspaper articles), the reasonable observer 
is shielded from important non-public information regarding 
actual purpose. 
McCreary County makes clear that the reasonable observer’s 
impression of the apparent government purpose will depend 
in part on how well an impermissible motive is hidden or, 
rather, how diligently the reasonable observer—as manipu-
lated by a court—searches for it: 
If someone in the government hides religious motive so well 
that the “objective observer, acquainted with the text, legis-
lative history, and implementation of the statute,” . . . cannot 
see it, then without something more the government does 
not make a divisive announcement that in itself amounts to 
taking religious sides. A secret motive stirs up no strife and 
does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it suf-
fices to wait and see whether such government action turns 
out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the illegitimate 
effect of advancing religion.221 
The Court implies that this level of inquiry is no different than 
before, but the focus of the analysis, and of the harm, has 
shifted.222 The Court is so unconcerned with rooting out an ac-
tual impermissible purpose that it blithely suggests that if an 
impermissible government purpose escapes notice, then an ef-
fects-endorsement analysis will probably function as a suffi-
cient safety net. Evaluating only perceived purpose will 
                                                                                                                  
220. See Smith, supra note 130, at 284. 
221. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2735 (citations omitted). 
222. See supra notes 180–87 and accompanying text. 
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absolve government actors if their attempts to act unconstitu-
tionally are concealed just carefully enough and do not achieve 
the desired effect. This could happen anyway with an actual 
purpose analysis, but there is a significant difference between 
unconstitutional behavior escaping censure because of a sys-
temic error and the same behavior being permitted in the first 
instance.  
As explained earlier, intelligent design is presented as a sci-
entific theory, and its adherents speak reverently of its secular 
nature; some even state that the intelligent designer to whom 
all credit is given could be an alien life form.223 Intelligent de-
sign proponents present themselves as promoting their ideas 
for the secular purposes of fostering critical thinking, religious 
neutrality, and academic freedom.224 Although some intelligent 
design proponents admit an overtly religious motivation for 
their ideas, most do not.225 Thus, if a religious motive is present 
in an intelligent-design-friendly policy or statute, as intelligent 
design’s critics routinely presume,226 that motive is likely to be 
at least partially hidden. Accordingly, if the reasonable ob-
server evaluating an intelligent design policy considers a stated 
secular primary government purpose and cursorily evaluates 
the context and legislative history of a questioned action, the 
government purpose inquiry easily could end there, with a de-
termination that an intelligent design policy does not violate 
the Establishment Clause. If the reasonable observer is aware 
either of Christian fundamentalists’ and creationists’ “typical 
opinion” of evolution227 or of the religious motivation of many 
involved in the intelligent design movement, though, the rea-
sonable observer might probe the government’s apparent pur-
pose further, given that the only limits on an objective, 
reasonable observer are those set by the guiding court. How-
ever, the reasonable observer does not have to do so, and the 
level of invasiveness in its inquiry is unpredictable. This dem-
onstrates the primary malignancy in McCreary County: The de-
cision creates a reasonable observer whose form and function 
                                                                                                                  
223. See Calvert, supra note 15, at 4, 8 n.9; Ratliff, supra note 82. 
224. See supra Part II.A.3. 
225. See supra notes 75–88 and accompanying text. 
226. See, e.g., Mackenzie, supra note 10; Ratliff, supra note 82; Media Matters for 
America, supra note 67. 
227. A reasonable observer in the Northern District of Georgia recently was so 
aware. See Selman v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 
2005). 
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are unprecedentedly malleable, and thus dangerously uncer-
tain.  
Whether the reasonable observer is a more or less aggressive 
investigator of apparent purpose, an ultimate search for actual 
purpose should not be the focus of a court’s analysis after 
McCreary County, as the constitutional harm now follows the 
public appearance of impropriety.228 The recent trial involving 
the Dover, Pennsylvania school district’s intelligent design pol-
icy illustrates various difficulties resulting from the reasonable 
observer’s consideration of formal proffered purpose, as well 
as government actors’ public statements. At trial, the school 
district argued that it adopted the policy because it intended to 
“promote[] critical thinking” by enhancing students’ under-
standing of the theory of evolution.229 The plaintiffs, however, 
presented evidence that the most infamous board member 
made statements at school board meetings referring to a sci-
ence textbook being “laced with Darwinism,” declaring 
“[n]owhere in the Constitution does it call for a separation of 
church and state,” and posing the rhetorical question, “Two 
thousand years ago, someone died on a cross; [c]an’t someone 
take a stand for him?”230 Based in part on these comments as 
well as various school board members’ reported references to 
“creationism” during board meetings in the months preceding 
the adoption of the intelligent design policy, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that school board members adopted the policy for the 
purpose of infusing religion into the Dover schools.231  
Publicly declared and reported statements such as these con-
stitute the traditional type—and arguably the full extent—of 
information about motive to which a reasonable observer pre-
sumably would be privy.232 Yet as the Dover trial made clear, 
when the accuracy of newspaper accounts is called into ques-
tion, the reasonable observer’s role is complicated further. 
                                                                                                                  
228. See supra notes 174–77, 181–82 and accompanying text. 
229. Transcript of Trial Proceeding, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 21–24; Martha 
Raffaele, Board Member Testifies in Evolution Case, GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2005, available 
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230. Coyne, supra note 3, at 21. 
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Depositions Refer to Creationism, YORK DAILY REC., Aug. 10, 2005, at C1. 
232. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714–15 (M.D. 
Pa. 2005). See also supra notes 130, 141, 147–49, 158–62, 177, 227 and accompanying 
text.  
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School board members testified that two newspaper articles 
incorrectly reported board members to have used the word 
“creationism” when discussing science instruction during a 
June 2004 board meeting, just four months before the board 
adopted the intelligent design policy.233 Because the school dis-
trict’s audio recording of the meeting in question disappeared 
before discovery began, the reporters who wrote the articles 
were subpoenaed; they testified in depositions and in court 
that their articles accurately reflected board members’ use of 
the word “creationism.”234 Ultimately, the district court found 
that the articles accurately reflected what transpired at the 
board meeting.235 Under McCreary County, because the court 
found the articles accurate, that finding would likely comport 
with a reasonable observer’s presumption. If the court had 
found the board members’ denials correct, though, then a rea-
sonable observer also would have been presumed to doubt the 
accuracy of the newspaper accounts without any apparent rea-
son to do so, as no board member requested a retraction of ei-
ther article.  
In the Dover trial, less controversy existed about the validity 
of other public statements, and depending on the number of 
board members and administrators who publicly expressed the 
following types of sentiments, the evidence might or might not 
be sufficient to create an apparent impermissible government 
purpose. One school board member’s June 2004 letter to the 
editor regarding the intelligent design controversy stated, “You 
can teach creationism without it being Christianity. It’s just a 
higher power.”236 Another school board member stated in a 
television interview around the same time that he supported 
balancing the teaching of evolution with something “such as 
creationism.”237 Nonetheless, the Dover trial also demonstrates 
that the reasonable observer would not have a full picture of 
government purpose without a more searching factual inquiry 
                                                                                                                  
233. Transcript of Trial Proceeding, supra note 1, Day 16 PM, at 5; id., Day 16 
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into board members’ and administrators’ non-public state-
ments. First, the intelligent design policy was not adopted until 
October 2004, but the Dover superintendent’s notes from Janu-
ary 2002 and March 2003 reflect a school board member’s re-
peated discussion of “creationism” at school board retreats.238 
Second, approximately a year and a half before the intelligent 
design policy was adopted, the school district’s assistant super-
intendent told the chairperson of the Dover high school science 
department that a school board member “wanted half the evo-
lution unit devoted to ‘creationism.’”239 Third, the assistant su-
perintendent drafted changes to the biology curriculum using 
the word “creationism,” a term eventually replaced by “intelli-
gent design” before the board adopted the policy (though a 
board member referred to the policy as referencing “creation-
ism” after the policy was adopted).240 Fourth, the school board 
policy referred students to the early intelligent design reference 
book Of Pandas and People, a book with strong roots in creation-
ism.241 Fifth, the school district surreptitiously received two 
classroom sets of this book (sixty copies in all) because one 
school board member raised money to purchase the copies by 
soliciting cash donations at his church, and then wrote a per-
sonal check for the collected amount so that the father of an-
other board member could purchase and donate the books.242  
These five examples (and others considered by the district 
court)243 certainly seem to be important clues about govern-
ment intent, yet they are clues from which the reasonable ob-
server should be shielded because of the non-public nature of 
the statements. The Dover plaintiffs likely could have won 
their case based on publicly available information alone, with-
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out need for a more demanding purpose inquiry. But, based on 
the situation in Dover, it is not difficult to imagine a similar 
situation in which some or all school board members and dis-
trict administrators are more savvy, and secret away religious 
purpose more effectively behind closed doors.  
Thus, when moving backwards from a searching analysis of 
actual purpose to a less demanding inquiry into apparent pur-
pose, courts must shield the reasonable observer from impor-
tant information about motive to preserve the integrity of the 
reasonable observer’s analysis. Government officials should 
not be able to enact laws or policies that violate their oaths of 
office in which they swear to uphold the Constitution of the 
United States merely because their covert intent to act uncon-
stitutionally was not followed by the desired effect. This, how-
ever, is what McCreary County may permit. 
2. Increasing Problems with “Neutrality” 
Relying on the reasonable observer’s perspective creates the 
challenge of trying to fashion a “neutral” or “objective” frame 
of reference for the reasonable observer.244 Additional problems 
arise when the reasonable observer, no longer merely opining 
about a statute or policy’s effect, must speculate about gov-
ernment intent from some ill-defined position of “neutrality,” a 
seemingly specific perspective that is not easily agreed upon in 
an intelligent design dispute. 
 The Court’s reasonable observers, previously arbiters of ef-
fect and endorsement, traditionally have not been representa-
tive of minority religious groups which may take more serious 
offense at public expressions of Judeo-Christian religious tradi-
tions.245 Presumably, then, the Establishment Clause’s reason-
able observer has viewed the world through some sort of 
Judeo-Christian lens when evaluating a statute or policy’s ef-
fect,246 and will continue to do so when evaluating apparent 
government purpose. However, it is unclear how a reasonable 
observer should view the intelligent design debate. With the 
country fairly evenly divided about such contentious issues as 
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whether the existence of life and the diversity of species are 
attributable primarily to natural forces or to specific divine in-
tervention, but not split along the lines of traditional majority 
and minority religious groups, it is difficult to imagine a “neu-
tral” perspective from which the reasonable observer might 
operate.247  
 Perhaps a reasonable observer is required to have no opinion 
about the validity of the theory of evolution or the concept of 
intelligent design. Under this characterization, a truly neutral 
reasonable observer should lack knowledge of religion and 
thus not subscribe to any particular sectarian or secular per-
spective. Yet, the reasonable observer reflects the community 
and, as such, is not a tabula rasa.248 Moreover, a “reasonable 
observer as blank slate” approach would strain the reasonable 
observer’s legitimacy, as the reasonable observer would be re-
jected by nearly all scientists for a failure to discard the concept 
of intelligent design and by intelligent design advocates for a 
failure to reject evolution. Furthermore, such a person either 
would be so apathetic as not to care enough to form an opinion 
about one of the questions most fundamental to human exis-
tence, or would lack the judgment to evaluate the scientific re-
search. Neither option fits with the Court’s model of a nearly 
omniscient reasonable observer. The reasonable observer is not 
constrained by typicality, but arguably is reined in by courts’ 
need for analytical legitimacy. 
 Presuming that some bias is inevitable in an intelligent de-
sign case, whether directly on the part of the reasonable ob-
server or indirectly through the court, perhaps the goal should 
be to have a reasonable observer who is fair, able to recognize 
personal bias, and more aware of ascribing a motive to gov-
ernment actors based on those assumptions. Again, the prob-
lem of the reasonable observer’s neutrality is even more 
difficult in the context of government purpose than in the ef-
fects-endorsement analysis because when viewing an effect, it 
is easier to distance oneself from personal bias. When making a 
judgment about covert intent, disentangling personal bias is 
much more difficult because of the necessity of ascribing some 
state of mind to the actor rather than dispassionately observing 
effects.  
                                                                                                                  
247. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra Parts III.B.3–4. 
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3. Apparent Intent’s Potential for Overreaching 
Finally, these difficulties demonstrate that a focus on per-
ceived government purpose may crucify government actors for 
apparently acting with an unconstitutional purpose in the ab-
sence of an actual intent. Justice Scalia expressed this concern 
in his McCreary County dissent.249 Striking down a statute or 
policy based on unconstitutional motive impugns “not only the 
legislators’ motives but also their honesty.”250 When based on 
mere apparent purpose, this action could undermine a branch 
of government without sufficient justification. A court’s ability 
to determine that a statute or policy violates a state or federal 
constitution is a core aspect of our system of government in 
which the three branches exert their checks and balances upon 
one another. For a court to strike down an intelligent design 
policy or statute as motivated by an impermissible government 
purpose, that court should base its decision on an exacting 
analysis necessarily, and uniformly, deeper than the reasonable 
observer’s mere perceptions. 
In the intelligent design context, the nearly omniscient rea-
sonable observer could be so skeptical of intelligent design’s 
recent and present links to religion251 that the reasonable ob-
server would be unable to imagine any primary secular pur-
pose for teaching intelligent design as valid science. Given the 
increasingly mutable nature of the reasonable observer, this is 
certainly possible and would lead to the conclusion that a 
school board had an obvious, apparent purpose of advancing 
religion by promoting the instruction of intelligent design. In-
deed, the district court in the Dover, Pennsylvania case deter-
mined that “an objective observer would know that [intelligent 
design] and teaching about ‘gaps’ and ‘problems’ in evolution-
ary theory are creationist, religious strategies that evolved from 
earlier forms of creationism.”252  
Yet it is possible that the government actors’ actual purpose 
could be at odds with this apparent purpose: that school board 
members could be, in good faith, swayed not by religion, but 
                                                                                                                  
249. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2757 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
250. Smith, supra note 130, at 286. 
251. For a chronology of the intelligent design movement, and exploration of its 
creationist roots in particular, see the Kitzmiller trial testimony of Dr. Barbara 
Forrest. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 6 AM, at 117–26. 
252. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 716 (M.D. Pa. 
2005). 
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by technical, seemingly complex discussions of bacterial fla-
gella and blood clotting systems such as those introduced by 
intelligent design proponent Michael Behe.253 Similarly, as ap-
parently happened in Dover, one or more board members 
could defer to other board members’ judgments that intelligent 
design is a credible scientific theory and teaching it promotes 
critical thinking, voting for an intelligent design policy without 
conducting any independent research on intelligent design 
whatsoever.254  
None of this is intended to imply that a court cannot control 
the reasonable observer inquiry, or that it will employ such an 
analysis in a haphazard manner without regard for reaching a 
defensible conclusion. Rather, the reasonable observer analysis 
requires a review one step removed from the perspective of the 
court.255 The intelligent design debates are so politically heated 
and religiously charged that each player questions the credibil-
ity and motive of all other players.256 Thus, courts’ decisions 
serve not only the traditional function of resolving legal de-
bates, but also the social function of giving legitimacy to the 
prevailing party in a manner that does not weaken the court’s 
own authority. In the intelligent design context, this will be ex-
ceptionally difficult because, if McCreary County is strictly ap-
plied, a purportedly neutral reasonable observer will draw 
conclusions about governmental intent based on necessarily 
incomplete factual information and a nearly omniscient per-
spective on issues of law. These challenges weaken the court’s 
ability to render a credible decision and highlight the difficul-
ties that occur when the inquiry into government purpose is 
effectively curtailed. Thus, when questioning legislators’ mo-
tives, an actual purpose analysis is indispensable. For all these 
reasons, the shift in constitutional harm from actual to appar-
ent government purpose is inherently problematic.  
                                                                                                                  
253. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 11 AM, at 4–30. 
254. See id., Day 6 AM, at 117–26. 
255. See supra notes 135–36, 150–52, 162, 194–96 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. See also Transcript of Trial 
Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 10 AM, at 89–90 (discussing Dr. Kenneth Miller’s 
critique of Dr. Michael Behe’s irreducible complexity concept). 
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B. What Did the Reasonable Observer Know,  
and When Did the Reasonable Observer Know It? 
After McCreary County, the legal fiction of the reasonable ob-
server takes center stage in the government purpose inquiry. 
As such, what the reasonable observer is presumed to know 
becomes even more important in an Establishment Clause case 
such as an intelligent design dispute. Although the reasonable 
observer’s factual knowledge of context will necessarily be lim-
ited, imputing the requisite legal knowledge to the reasonable 
observer will result in the most bizarrely ultra-knowledgeable 
reasonable observers to date. One issue in particular brings this 
into focus: In various ways over the past four years, intelligent 
design advocates have asserted that the No Child Left Behind 
Act of 2001 (NCLB) supports, if not requires, the teaching of 
intelligent design.257 In 2005, this argument was made exten-
sively during the Kansas Board of Education’s consideration of 
proposed revisions to state science standards and briefly dur-
ing the Dover trial.258  
The extent of the reasonable observer’s necessary knowledge 
of issues of law will be enumerated momentarily. Bear in mind 
that throughout the reasonable observer’s existence in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence, there is little the reasonable ob-
server has been presumed not to know about social practices or 
legal requirements. 
1. NCLB’s Requirements, or Lack Thereof 
Let us assume that a state or local board of education relied 
on advice such as that given by Intelligent Design Network co-
founder and Missouri attorney John Calvert, and mandated 
teaching of intelligent design with the stated purpose of com-
pliance with NCLB. Parents of affected schoolchildren would 
bring a lawsuit asserting that the new state standard or local 
school board policy violates the Establishment Clause, and one 
of the first questions a trial court would face is whether a rea-
sonable observer would perceive that the government’s appar-
ent purpose was to endorse religion or to act with hostility 
toward religion. To evaluate whether the stated government 
purpose is a sham, the reasonable observer will need to assess 
                                                                                                                  
257. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 24–25 (defen-
dant’s opening statement); Calvert, supra note 75, at 5–7. 
258. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 24–25. 
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the legitimacy of the government’s proffered purpose (in other 
words, whether NCLB requires what the state actor says it 
does), and the government’s apparent confidence in that pur-
pose (whether the government actor appeared to know that it 
was relying on bad advice, which is in part dependent on 
whether a government actor should have known what the law 
requires).259 Therefore, the reasonable observer will need 
knowledge of NCLB that almost certainly exceeds that of 
nearly all state and local school boards in the country. The rea-
sonable observer will know the following: 
In January 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law 
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 670 pages in its final 
form. NCLB defines science as a “core academic subject.”260 It 
requires states to adopt science standards by the 2005–2006 
school year, and to begin testing student science achievement 
by the 2007–2008 school year.261 Aside from these general re-
quirements, few provisions of NCLB relate to science instruc-
tion.262 Over the past four years, intelligent design advocates 
                                                                                                                  
259. See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
260. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, § 9101(d)(11), Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 
Stat. 1425, 1958 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter NCLB]. 
261. NCLB § 1111(b)(1)(C) (adoption of standards); § 1111(b)(3)(C)(v)(ii) (science 
testing must occur once in grades 3–5, grades 6–9, and grades 10–12). Although 
NCLB contains strict sanctions for schools in which any subgroup of students fails 
to make adequate yearly progress in reading or math achievement, there are no 
statutory sanctions for low performance on science tests. 
262. This is in direct contrast to NCLB’s extensive focus on reading and math 
instruction. Although the sanctions for low performance on reading and math 
tests are severe, there are no sanctions for low performance on science tests. The 
“highly qualified teacher” provisions of NCLB apply to science teachers, although 
NCLB does not single out science teachers. All teachers hired after January 8, 
2002, the effective date of NCLB, must be “highly qualified” at the time of hiring: 
In other words, certified by the state to teach in a particular area. Id. § 1119(a)(1). 
Further, all teachers of core subjects (including science) must become highly 
qualified by the 2005–2006 school year. Id. § 1119(a)(2).  
In other provisions related to science education, NCLB requires that the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress test students’ science achievement. 
Id. § 602. It also permits the troops-to-teachers program to help address the 
nationwide shortage of science teachers. Id. §§ 2301–2307. Finally, it creates 
programs to encourage science education; e.g., § 1705(c)(4) (developing advanced 
placement science programs); § 2113(c)(3) (designing alternative certification for 
science teachers); § 2113(c)(12) (instituting merit-based pay and financial 
incentives for science teachers); §§ 2201–2203 (creating partnerships between 
public schools and institutes of higher education to train science teachers and 
develop science curricula); § 4205(a)(2) (including science instruction in 21st 
Century Community Learning Centers); §§ 5701–5311 (encouraging science 
instruction in the Magnet Schools Assistance Program); §§ 5471–5477 (recognizing 
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have mistakenly claimed that three aspects of NCLB support 
teaching intelligent design: a sense of the Senate amendment 
that was not part of the final legislation, the non-binding con-
ference committee report, and NCLB’s requirements that sup-
plemental education services and nationally standardized 
testing be conducted in a “secular, neutral, non-ideological” 
manner. 263  
2. The Santorum Amendment 
The first point of confusion has its genesis in an amendment 
Senator Rick Santorum introduced when NCLB was first before 
the Senate: 
It is the sense of the Senate that—(1) good science education 
should prepare students to distinguish the data or testable 
theories of science from philosophical or religious claims 
that are made in the name of science; and (2) where biologi-
cal evolution is taught, the curriculum should help students 
to understand why this subject generates so much continu-
ing controversy, and should prepare the students to be in-
formed participants in public discussions regarding the 
subject.264 
After brief debate, the amendment passed by a vote of 91-8 and 
became part of the initial bill adopted by the Senate.265 The 
                                                                                                                  
science instruction achievement in the Star Schools Program); §§ 5611–5618 
(noting participation rates of girls and women in science programs in the 
Women’s Educational Equity Act); § 7121 (Improvement of Education 
Opportunities for Indian Children); § 7134 (Gifted and Talented Indian Students); 
§ 7205(3)(F) (science programs for gifted and talented native Hawaiian students); 
§ 7304(2)(F) (science programs for native Alaskan students). This footnote 
contains a comprehensive listing of all science-related provisions contained in 
NCLB. 
263. For a general discussion of NCLB’s requirements regarding science and the 
Santorum Amendment in particular, see Wexler, supra note 45, at 835–40. 
264. 147 CONG. REC. S6147–48 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Santorum). 
265. 147 CONG. REC. S6153 (daily ed. June 13, 2001). The eight Senators voting in 
opposition may have done so out of concern for federal intrusion into a matter of 
local control rather than based on an understanding of the religious overtone of 
the amendment. See Larry Witham, Senate Bill Tackles Evolution Debate, WASH. 
TIMES, June 18, 2001, at A4. The National Center for Science Education speculated, 
“[I]t seems likely that most of the Senators who voted for the bill were unaware of 
[its] anti-evolution implications.” Glenn Branch, NCSE Office Manager, Nat’l Ctr. 
For Science Educ., Farewell to the Santorum Amendment?, http://www.ncseweb.org/ 
resources/rncse_content/vol22/283_farewell_to_the_santorum_amend_12_30_1899.asp 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2006). Interestingly, Senator Robert Byrd and Senator Edward 
Kennedy spoke in favor of a “teach the controversy” approach regarding 
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Santorum Amendment was not included in the final text of the 
legislation, however.266 In the four years since NCLB was 
signed into law, misleading information about the Santorum 
Amendment has been circulated repeatedly. In spring 2002, 
Senator Santorum, Ohio Representatives John Boehner and 
Steve Chabot, and others made prominent public statements 
that the Santorum Amendment had become law.267 Two years 
later, in the introduction to his 2004 book Uncommon Dissent: 
Intellectuals Who Find Darwinism Unconvincing, Southern Baptist 
Theological Seminary professor William Dembski reprinted the 
Santorum Amendment, noting the vote by which it passed the 
Senate without mentioning that the amendment failed to be-
come law.268 Most recently, during opening statements in the 
trial of the Dover, Pennsylvania intelligent design policy in 
September 2005, the school district’s attorney referred to the 
Santorum Amendment as though it was part of NCLB and thus 
                                                                                                                  
evolution, suggesting their lack of awareness of the amendment’s potential 
effects. 147 CONG. REC. S6150, S6152 (daily ed. June 13, 2001) (statements of Sen. 
Kennedy and Sen. Byrd). 
266. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Miller, Professor of Biology, Brown Univ., The Truth 
About the “Santorum Amendment” Language on Evolution, http://www.millerand 
levine.com/km/evol/santorum.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006); Intelligent Design 
and Evolution Awareness Center, U.S. Senate Passes Santorum Amendment, 
Supports Critical Thinking Regarding Evolutionary Theory: ***Santorum 
Amendment Update***, http://www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/ 
1195 (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).  
267. For example, in an editorial, Senator Santorum asserted that his 
amendment was a “provision” of the newly enacted NCLB. Rick Santorum, 
Illiberal Education in Ohio Schools, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A14. 
Approximately one week later, the Washington Times quoted Ohio Representatives 
John Boehner and Steve Chabot stating the same contention. Greg Pierce, State of 
Hysteria, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at A05. When testifying before the Ohio 
State Board of Education in the March 6, 2002 hearings regarding proposed 
revisions to Ohio Science Standards, Steven Meyer of the Discovery Institute also 
stated that the Santorum Amendment had become law. See Stephen C. Meyer, 
Discovery News Institute, Teach the Controversy (March 30, 2002), http://www. 
discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=1134; see also David 
J. Hoff, And Congress Said, Let There Be Other Views. Or Did It?, EDUC. WEEK, June 
12, 2002, at 28. 
Recently, Senator Santorum stated on NPR that “[a]s far as intelligent design is 
concerned, I really don’t believe it has risen to the level of a scientific theory at this 
point that we would want to teach it alongside of evolution.” Lauri Lebo, Senator 
Recasts Science Stance, YORK DAILY REC., Aug. 5, 2005, at A1. 
268. See William Dembski, Introduction: The Myths of Darwinism, in UNCOMMON 
DISSENT: INTELLECTUALS WHO FIND DARWINISM UNCONVINCING xix (William A. 
Dembski ed. 2004). 
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binding law.269 The reasonable observer, of course, would not 
be misled by any of this, and at this point in time, neither 
should a local school board, state board of education, or state 
legislature. 
3. Conference Committee Report Language 
The second point of confusion comes from the nearly 400-
page Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Confer-
ence (the conference committee report submitted to both houses 
with the final legislation), which echoed the sentiment of the 
Santorum Amendment: 
The Conferees recognize that a quality science education 
should prepare students to distinguish the data and testable 
theories of science from religious or philosophical claims 
that are made in the name of science. Where topics are 
taught that may generate controversy (such as biological 
evolution), the curriculum should help students to under-
stand the full range of scientific views that exist, why such 
topics may generate controversy, and how scientific discov-
eries can profoundly affect society.270 
Normally, conference committee report language would be 
relevant as part of a statute’s legislative history; however, it is 
unclear how much, if any, weight should be given to the al-
ready non-binding271 “teach the controversy” language of the 
conference committee report, given both the enormity of this 
legislation and the absence of any corresponding statutory 
provision for the report language quoted above.272 The March 
2004 opinion letter to the Darby, Montana school board from 
attorney John Calvert suggests the conference committee report 
deserves significant deference: 
                                                                                                                  
269. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 1, Day 1 AM, at 24–25 
(defendant’s opening statement); id., Day 6 PM, at 83 (cross-examination of 
Barbara Forrest during which counsel for the school district clarified that the 
Santorum Amendment is not part of NCLB). 
270. H.R. REP. NO. 107-334, at 78 (2001) (Conf. Rep.). This language comes from 
the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, which was 
included in the Conference Committee Report. 
271. See Wexler, supra note 45, at 766. 
272. Thus, the language would not even seem to garner the attention of a court 
interpreting the statute. See FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, & PUBLIC 
EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT 
DESIGN xxi (2003). 
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The legislative history of No Child Left Behind also makes it 
clear that Congress considers evolution to be a controversial 
theory that should be taught objectively. This is evident 
from the [conference committee report]. . . . Clearly an offi-
cial policy that censors or downplays scientific criticisms of 
“biological evolution” and that does not permit discussion 
of alternative scientific views is contradictory to this ad-
vice . . . .273  
At best, Calvert overstates the binding nature of the conference 
committee report. At worst, that portion of his legal advice is 
simply wrong. Regardless, a reasonable observer would know 
that the language is not binding and would consider that 
knowledge of the law as part of the background for an evalua-
tion of government purpose. 
4. The “Secular, Neutral, and Nonideological” Directives 
 The third point of confusion is, to be fair, a more complicated 
argument. Calvert and the authors of the March 2005 Kansas 
Science Standards Committee Minority Report contend that 
NCLB’s repeated use of the phrase “secular, neutral and non-
ideological” creates a statutory requirement that evolution be 
taught critically, if not accompanied by the concept of intelli-
gent design outright.274 The Minority Report points to two pro-
visions: First, NCLB requires the standardized National Assess-
ment of Education Progress (NAEP) to be “free from racial, cul-
tural, gender, or regional bias, and . . . secular, neutral, and 
nonideological.”275 The NAEP is not directly related to local 
school districts’ curricular choices, however. It is a nationally 
standardized test administered to sample groups of fourth, 
                                                                                                                  
273. Calvert, supra note 75, at 6–7 (citations omitted). 
274. Id. at 5. 
275. NCLB § 412(e)(4), Pub. L. No. 107-10, 115 Stat. 1425, 1906 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (amending the National Education Statistics Act of 
1994). The Department of Education uses NAEP data as a check on states’ reports 
regarding their own student achievement, but even David Winick, Chairperson of the 
National Assessment Governing Board, notes that the NAEP and NCLB tests have 
different purposes and are not interchangeable. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Science 
Assessment Meeting Proceedings (June 18–19, 2004), http://www.ed.gov/ 
rschstat/research/progs/mathscience/science-assessment/proceedings.pdf. Although 
NCLB focuses on states’ establishing their own curricular standards and testing 
students’ achievement towards those state standards, it has been clear from the 
beginning that states’ performance on NAEP tests does not track with states’ 
performance on their own standards-based tests. Rand Education, Research Brief: 
Meeting Literacy Goals Stated by NCLB (2005), http://www.rand.org/publications/ 
RB/RB9081-1/.  
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eighth, and twelfth grade students across the country each 
year. The NAEP tracks student achievement in eleven subject 
areas, including science. Resulting data is disaggregated by 
such factors as sex and racial or ethnic group, but it is not re-
ported by school or district and is only occasionally reported 
by state.276 The science test was given in 2000 and again in 
spring 2005; it is not scheduled to be given again until 2009.277 
Although the NAEP evaluates students’ acquisition of scientific 
knowledge and reasoning, several inferential leaps are re-
quired to move from the NCLB requirement, to confidential 
NAEP questions, to state science standards, to mandatory in-
clusion of intelligent design in a school district’s curriculum. 
Second, the Minority Report notes that NCLB requires sup-
plemental service providers, usually organizations providing 
tutoring to children in failing schools, to provide academic con-
tent and instruction that are “secular, neutral and nonideologi-
cal.”278 This provision has no bearing on states’ and school 
districts’ decisions regarding the teaching of evolution. Rather, 
it opens the door for religiously affiliated organizations and 
parochial schools to qualify as supplemental service providers 
so long as they do not engage in religious instruction while de-
livering the educational services for which they are receiving 
federal funds. The remaining statutory provisions using the 
phrase “secular, neutral and nonideological” are triggered 
when private schools receive NCLB funds and, similarly, have 
no connection to local school district curricula.279  
                                                                                                                  
276. See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, NAEP Overview, http://nces.ed.gov/ 
nationsreportcard/about/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2006). 
277. Results from the 2005 NAEP are expected in Spring 2006. See id.  
278. NCLB § 1116(e)(5)(D). 
279. For example, NCLB requires that private schools receiving subsidies for 
special education services or other benefits (materials and equipment) guarantee 
to the state or local education agency that the funds will only be used in a manner 
that is “secular, neutral and nonideological.” § 1120(a)(2). Additionally, NCLB 
also permits public funds to be used for professional development of private 
school teachers who teach English language learning students. In that context, 
states must assure the federal government that local education agencies provide 
services, materials and equipment to private school non-English speaking 
students in a manner that is “secular, neutral and nonideological.” § 3245(a)(7)(A). 
Further, NCLB makes funding available for innovative educational programs. 
States can apply for these funds to redevelop state curricular standards, create 
new student and school district assessments, encourage charter schools, and 
initiate other statewide education reforms. School districts can use these funds to 
develop gifted and talented programs, magnet schools and charter schools, adult 
literacy initiatives, professional development opportunities, alternative education 
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5. What Is a Reasonable Observer to Do? 
All of the foregoing is the legal background a reasonable ob-
server must have to properly evaluate the accuracy of a state or 
local school board’s statement that its purpose in requiring 
teaching of intelligent design is to comply with the spirit or let-
ter of NCLB. The reasonable observer’s job is not done, how-
ever, after determining that there is no such statutory or 
regulatory requirement. The next question in the government 
purpose analysis is whether, based on a reasonable observer’s 
analysis of public statements and other readily available infor-
mation,280 the school board appeared to accept a materially in-
accurate characterization of NCLB, or whether it questioned 
the unsound advice yet acted on it anyway. Several more prob-
lems become obvious at this point. 
First, a school board’s unquestioning reliance on bad legal 
advice would seem to help immunize it from an Establishment 
Clause violation from the perspective of a reasonable observer, 
a result that would encourage school boards to silence their 
questions about church-state conflict and instead maintain ig-
norance. Because an apparent purpose analysis is necessarily 
less complete than an actual purpose inquiry, the reasonable 
observer could cursorily determine that while the school 
board’s purpose may have been based on a misunderstanding 
of law, it was not based on an impermissible purpose of ad-
vancing religion. This is the sort of situation in which any ac-
tual impermissible purpose may not be caught, and the safety 
net of the effects-endorsement analysis would have sole re-
sponsibility for catching an Establishment Clause violation.281 
Of course, the malleable reasonable observer also could reach a 
very different determination: that the school board disregarded 
intelligent design’s religious connections and the constitutional 
importance of keeping religious instruction separate from pub-
                                                                                                                  
services, school-based mental health programs, and other initiatives. Again, 
private schools are eligible for this funding—if they will use the funding to 
provide “secular, neutral and nonideological services, materials, and 
equipment . . . .” § 5142(a)(1)(A)(i). Finally, this sentiment is reiterated in Title IX 
General Provisions, clarifying that with respect to major portions of the act in 
which private schools may be eligible for NCLB funds, the “educational services 
or benefits” provided to those schools “must be secular, neutral, and 
nonideological.” § 9501(a)(2). 
280. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
281. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(1984). 
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lic school curricula. In other words, if the school board receives 
legal advice that it should be able to recognized as flawed, it 
could appear unlikely that the school board had truly based its 
decision on the stated reason, in which case an actual purpose 
analysis is even more important. Again, we see the reasonable 
observer’s inconsistency and unpredictability in the wake of 
McCreary County. 
Second, a school board’s decision to rely on legal advice of 
questionable credibility suggests more clearly that other mo-
tives were at play, and that the stated purpose is a sham in-
tended to disguise an impermissible purpose of advancing 
religion. This situation would likely result in a more invasive 
apparent purpose inquiry, but it is important to remember that 
in an intelligent design controversy, religion-based motives are 
less likely to be blatant and more likely to be discovered only 
through depositions and written discovery.282 Some courts have 
constrained the reasonable observer’s perspective to facts that 
are easily knowable,283 but, to be fair, courts have also applied 
this same limit to their own analyses of actual purpose, not 
necessarily digging into discovery to strike down a statute or 
policy as motivated by an impermissible government pur-
pose.284 Nevertheless, after McCreary County, the reasonable 
observer’s knowledge of the government actors’ expressions of 
intent is necessarily more limited than a court’s.285 Although a 
court may choose to rely on public facts such as statements 
made at school board meetings and to the press, the court is 
not confined to examining public facts. A reasonable observer 
is confined to that material. In a situation such as an intelligent 
design debate, damning facts, if they exist, are much less likely 
to be public, thus requiring a more intensive investigation of 
government purpose.286  
                                                                                                                  
282. See, e.g., Lebo, supra note 231 (reporting deposition testimony regarding 
public and private comments of school board members about intelligent design 
and creationism). In a state such as Illinois, the plaintiffs could even request the 
audio recording of a closed-session board meeting, because maintaining audio 
records has been mandatory since January 2004. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2.06 
(2005). 
283. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
284. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2736–37 (2005). 
285. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
286. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 748–62 
(M.D. Pa. 2005). 
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For these reasons, importing the reasonable observer into the 
government purpose analysis affects the analysis of both issues 
of law and issues of fact in peculiar ways, making the reason-
able observer ever more a fiction in the colloquial sense of the 
word, parting ways with a typical member of the community 
not by inches but by yards. 
C. The Ever-Important Standard of Review 
After McCreary County, the government purpose inquiry, 
which is particularly critical in an intelligent design case where 
courts will evaluate the perceived credibility of the govern-
ment’s proffered purpose from the perspective of a reasonable 
observer, changes from a finding of fact to a question of law. 
As such, district courts’ government purpose analyses now will 
be reviewed uniformly de novo. Before McCreary County, the 
circuits were split on the proper standard of review for find-
ings of fact within a government purpose analysis, so even 
though this change will bring coherence to a small part of a 
fractured doctrine (the procedure, not the substance), it is an 
apparently unforeseen, and, for the reasons explained below, 
inadequately justified if not detrimental consequence of 
McCreary County. 
Like the burden of proof at trial, the standard of review on 
appeal is so important that, at times, it is effectively outcome-
determinative.287 Generally, a district court’s findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error: whether “the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.”288 Its conclusions of law are 
reviewed de novo: they may be reversed merely if the review-
ing court, standing in the place of the trial court, would have 
reached a different result. This distinction permits trial courts, 
with their greater proximity to the evidence and witnesses, to 
make factual findings to which appellate courts defer signifi-
cantly.289 By contrast, trial courts’ legal conclusions receive 
greater scrutiny from appellate courts, which have more time 
to deliberate about what precedent requires as well as greater 
                                                                                                                  
287. See, e.g., Bryan Adamson, All Facts Are Not Created Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 629, 629 (2004); Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential 
Robes?: A Deconstruction of the Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal 
System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 531 (2004). 
288. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
289. See Nicolas, supra note 287, at 533–34. 
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responsibility to direct the development of the law.290 Perhaps 
predictably, Establishment Clause cases present an exception to 
these general rules.  
The circuits are split regarding the proper level of deference 
appropriate for district courts regarding findings of fact in Es-
tablishment Clause cases, but all circuits examine conclusions 
of law de novo. Specifically, the Third,291 Sixth,292 and Tenth293 
Circuits review constitutional facts (facts “fundamental to the 
existence of a constitutional right,” an erratically applied con-
cept)294 de novo, while reviewing lower courts’ determinations 
of subsidiary facts for clear error. The Fourth,295 Seventh,296 and 
Eleventh297 Circuits review all findings of fact in Establishment 
Clause cases for clear error. Nearly twenty years before 
McCreary County, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch v. 
Donnelly (in which she introduced the reasonable observer and 
the endorsement test) reviewed a lower court’s government 
purpose inquiry for clear error.298 More recently, the Eleventh 
Circuit made clear that an inquiry into actual government pur-
pose was a factual inquiry under circuit law.299 This is consis-
tent with circuit courts’ general recognition that the evaluation 
of government purpose is based on facts, whether the circuit is 
                                                                                                                  
290. See Adamson, supra note 287, at 630. 
291. See Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 
386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 
309 F.3d 144, 156–57 (3d Cir. 2002). 
292. See ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 
2004); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2002). 
293. See O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 922 (10th Cir. 2002); 
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002). 
294. Adamson, supra note 287, at 633 (quoting Martin Louis, Allocating 
Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified 
View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 
N.C. L. REV. 993, 995 n.13 (1986)). The Supreme Court and lower courts do not 
apply the constitutional facts doctrine with much, if any, uniformity. Accordingly, 
although the constitutional facts doctrine does control non-jury First Amendment 
malice cases, it does not control all First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Ronald J. 
Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1769, 1786 (2003); see also Adam Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De 
Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1442–43 (2001). 
295. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 508 (4th Cir. 2001). 
296. See Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2001). 
297. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1291, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2003); King 
v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). 
298. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
299. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1296–97. 
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one that classifies those facts as constitutional or not. Neverthe-
less, after McCreary County, the inquiry into government pur-
pose from the reasonable observer’s perspective has become a 
matter of law, and thus subject to de novo review across the 
circuits.300 
While uniformity among circuits about a procedural or sub-
stantive matter generally is preferable to a circuit split, the 
resolution of such a split should occur after thorough consid-
eration of the divergent rules, their origins, and their effects. If 
the Court in McCreary County considered the issue of the 
changing standard of review, the opinions do not discuss it.  
Setting aside the Court’s silence, a compelling reason for de 
novo review of a government purpose inquiry would be for 
appellate courts to develop and maintain a coherent body of 
substantive case law, even if limited to intra-circuit consis-
tency.301 But, given the general incoherence of the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause cases, any sort of substantive 
doctrinal consistency will almost necessarily be elusive in Es-
tablishment Clause cases generally and in intelligent design 
cases particularly. Consider the results of Establishment Clause 
cases that have peppered the dockets of courts of appeals 
across the country for the past decade: The overwhelming 
number of these cases have been reviewed de novo, either be-
cause the reviewing court is evaluating the propriety of grant-
ing a motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss, or 
because it is evaluating constitutional facts or a conclusion of 
law.302 However, these cases as a whole were not bound to-
gether by a predictable, or predictive, set of legal rules; at times 
                                                                                                                  
300. The Second Circuit, for example, has specifically held that it reviews a 
reasonable observer’s conclusion de novo. Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 
F.3d 49, 75 (2d Cir. 2001). 
301. As the Supreme Court accepts an average of eighty to eighty-five cases per 
term, the federal courts of appeals in this country establish the vast majority of 
binding federal precedent.  
302. See, e.g., Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson County, 407 F.3d 266, 268 
(4th Cir. 2005) (motion to dismiss); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 
387 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. 
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Amendment immunity and statute of limitations issues); Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. 
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(summary judgment); Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 264 (6th Cir. 
2000) (summary judgment). 
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religious displays were permitted, at times rejected. These de-
cisions became consistent only in their lack of consistency, on 
occasion presenting apparent conflicts within a circuit.303 Even 
the recent pair of Supreme Court cases that grew out of this 
morass only answers questions at the extreme ends of the fac-
tual and legal spectra. The resulting unpredictability is not a 
satisfactory return for the considerable investment of private 
and judicial resources that the de novo review of these cases 
has required.304 
Thus, if (or when) a critical mass of intelligent design cases 
reaches district courts across the country, those courts inevita-
bly will invest their reasonable observers with extensive 
knowledge of matters of law. Reasonable observers will pre-
sumably know a good deal about the theory of evolution, the 
concept of intelligent design, NCLB’s lack of requirements re-
garding teaching intelligent design, and other similar issues.305 
The factors that will vary significantly from case to case are the 
public and private statements of the relevant government ac-
tors, which are arguably the reasonable observer’s greatest 
non-textual (and, as argued above, sometimes inaccessible) 
clues to apparent government purpose.  
After district courts take their turn, courts of appeals will 
uniformly exercise the least amount of deference possible to 
lower courts over essentially factual determinations in a messy 
area of law guided by unclear precedent. Despite what will cer-
tainly be their best efforts, the various courts of appeals will 
remain predisposed to reaching effectively inconsistent results. 
Because of likely narrow factual distinctions between intelli-
gent design cases, this effect also could occur within circuits. 
                                                                                                                  
303. Compare Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005) (permitting 
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administration building), with Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 
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Even if reasonable observers have a consistent presumed uni-
verse of knowledge—an occurrence that is theoretically possi-
ble but highly unlikely—factually distinguishing these cases 
from one another should not be difficult. This will create space 
for cases that draw peculiar distinctions and are in effect at 
odds with one another.306 Accordingly, the additional invest-
ment of judicial resources at the appellate level through a de 
novo review of the government purpose inquiry is unlikely to 
have much, if any, unifying effect on the emerging body of in-
telligent design case law either among or within the circuits. 
 Therefore, as the intelligent design context illustrates, the 
value of an actual governmental purpose inquiry has not dissi-
pated. If anything, this inquiry has become more crucial to 
maintaining government actors’ and courts’ legitimacy when 
courts confront intelligent design policies and statutes. For 
these reasons, a slight retreat from McCreary County is well ad-
vised. Despite inevitable invitations to do otherwise, the Court 
should affirm McCreary County’s central holding and maintain 
the importance of the government purpose inquiry. It should, 
however, limit the role of the reasonable observer to the effects-
endorsement analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 With McCreary County and so many other Establishment 
Clause cases decided 5-4, and Justice O’Connor often serving as 
a swing vote, this doctrine is one of many at a crossroads fol-
lowing her retirement. Whether the reasonable observer will 
fade away absent its creator and erstwhile champion remains 
to be seen, but it seems unlikely, at least, that the reasonable 
observer’s departure is imminent. Either way, the necessary 
results of McCreary County reach too far. The altered notion of 
the constitutional harm and limited scope of the objective ob-
server’s review, the expansion of the objective observer’s nec-
essary knowledge of law yet contraction of knowledge of facts 
in what is at core a factual inquiry, and the mandatory change 
in the standard of review without sufficient justification—each 
of these detrimental effects of McCreary County will become 
obvious as courts grapple with issues such as the burgeoning 
evolution-intelligent design disputes. For these reasons, gov-
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ernment purpose should not be perceived by the distanced 
eyes of the objective, reasonable observer, but rather ascer-
tained for actuality by the blinder-free eyes of courts. 
 
